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CRITIQUING MATTER OF A-B-: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN 




The #MeToo movement has brought renewed attention to the impact of gender 
inequality on our society’s ability to provide protection to women from physical 
and sexual violence, including intimate partner violence. Despite advances in 
legal protections and increased resources to prevent, prosecute, and bring an end 
to intimate partner violence, in the absence of true efforts to combat gender 
inequality as a whole, intimate partner violence will continue to pervade our 
society. The discussion of gender inequality’s impact on the treatment of intimate
partner violence must expand beyond the violence that occurs in the United States 
to gender inequality’s impact on the protection afforded to women who have 
suffered this violence in other countries and seek protection from the United States.
This is because U.S. asylum law trails decades behind even our flawed federal and 
state protections for victims of intimate partner violence. The male-centric lens 
through which the refugee definition was drafted and is interpreted continues to 
inhibit any progress in recognizing women’s asylum claims involving intimate 
partner violence.
This Article finds that Matter of A-B- returns to the perception that intimate 
partner violence is a personal matter outside the scope of asylum protections. The 
decision demonstrates continued ignorance regarding the underlying reasons for 
intimate partner violence against women—gender and subordination. The failure 
to recognize that intimate partner violence occurs because of a woman’s gender is 
one of the primary obstacles to improvements in the treatment of asylum claims 
involving intimate partner violence. This Article contrasts the lack of progress in 
U.S. asylum law to provide protection to women who suffer intimate partner 
violence outside the United States with the advancements made in federal and 
state efforts to combat intimate partner violence occurring inside the United States.
As a remedy, this Article recommends new legislation and regulations recognizing 
and guiding adjudication of these asylum claims, combined with judicial training 
and the development of a tracking mechanism for determinations in these types of 
cases. The current commitment to eradicating gender inequality within the United 
States is the perfect moment for reforming how we treat gender inequality when it
occurs outside the United States.
* Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law and Special Counsel 
with the law firm of Hall & Evans, LLC. I want to thank Professor Tamara Kuennen and Pro-
fessor Leah Wortham for their guidance in writing this Article and my husband for his sup-
port throughout the drafting process. I am also grateful for the work of the editors of the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform on this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In the era of #MeToo and #KeepFamiliesTogether, the momen-
tum exists now for real reform to happen in United States asylum 
law to protect victims seeking asylum due to gender-based violence. 
The #MeToo movement spotlights the inequalities and sexual har-
assment and assault faced by women in our society; #KeepFam-
iliesTogether advocates for ending family separation and more 
compassionate treatment for families who seek the safety and pro-
tections of our country. The American people reject a culture and 
political agenda that perpetuate inequality, abuse, and violence 
and demand that policymakers effect change. Despite this envi-
ronment of enlightenment and reform, Attorney General Jeff Ses-
sions issued a decision in Matter of A-B- that directly contradicts the 
calls to protect victims of gender-based violence and those fleeing 
to the United States for a safer life.
In June 2018, Sessions overturned an immigration judge’s deci-
sion to grant asylum status to a woman fleeing intimate partner vio-
lence.1 The Attorney General’s analysis regenerates the perception 
that intimate partner violence is a personal, private matter outside 
the scope of the “refugee” definition.2 The decision entirely ig-
nores the importance of social and cultural views of gender and 
subordination as the underlying reasons for the abuse and a coun-
1. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317, 346 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, 
No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
2. See id. at 316–46.
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try’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection. Legal scholars 
recognize that intimate partner violence is inflicted by non-
governmental actors against women because of their gender, an 
immutable characteristic forming a particular social group by it-
self.3 The abuser or non-governmental actor inflicts the abuse on 
account of the belief that because the victim is a woman, she is, 
therefore, subordinate.4
The Attorney General also used this opportunity to overturn a 
2014 precedent, Matter of A-R-C-G-.5 In that case, the United States 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recognized that a woman 
from Guatemala who suffered intimate partner violence-related 
persecution may meet the requirements for asylum. Specifically, 
the BIA found that she was a member of the particular social 
group comprised of “married women in Guatemala who are una-
ble to leave their relationship.”6 The decision appeared to demon-
strate movement forward in these cases. The Attorney General’s
decision to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G- in Matter of A-B-7 quashed any 
hope for fairer and more consistent determinations in asylum cases 
involving intimate partner violence until new legislation or regula-
tions are put in place to provide guidance. 
There is a stark contrast between the protections afforded wom-
en who are victims of intimate partner violence8 in the United 
States under U.S. federal and state law and the protections afford-
ed women fleeing intimate partner violence in other countries un-
der U.S. asylum law.9 The #MeToo movement has breathed new 
life into the discussion of physical and sexual violence against 
women and the continued gender inequality that impedes ade-
quate protections for women. Likewise, the #KeepFamiliesTogeth-
er trend forced the Trump Administration to retreat on a policy of 
3. See, e.g., Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J.
2512, 2525 (2014); Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A 
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781–83 (2003).
4. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82; see also Marsden, supra note 3.
5. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316, 346.
6. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–94 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
7. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 346.
8. Since some adjudicators have taken an overly narrow interpretation of the term 
“domestic violence,” particularly in regard to whether a relationship constitutes a “domestic”
relationship, this Article will use the term “intimate partner violence” wherever possible.
9. Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims 
of Domestic Violence, 7 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 109, 111–12 (2013) (arguing that state and fed-
eral support for the eradication of domestic violence is now commonplace while the treat-
ment of women who flee domestic violence at the U.S.–Mexico border face a justice system 
that is fifty years behind due to its treatment of domestic violence as a private matter).
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treating families who seek the protections of our country inhu-
manely. The issue of asylees escaping intimate partner violence ex-
ists at the intersection of these two movements. True reform can-
not be effected until policymakers develop a comprehensive 
approach to protecting victims of intimate partner violence in the 
United States regardless of whether the violence occurred in the
United States or in another country.10
This Article uses Matter of A-B-, past U.S. asylum cases, and other 
aspects of U.S. domestic violence law to call for a reform in U.S. 
asylum law; namely, a congressional act and new regulations to re-
ject the Attorney General’s ruling, recognize the viability of gen-
der-based asylum claims involving intimate partner violence, and 
provide guidance in their adjudication. Asylum claims by women 
involving intimate partner violence should no longer be at the 
mercy of the whims of an administration or the adjudicator. Ac-
cordingly, this Article argues that the barriers to asylum claims 
based on intimate partner violence can be overcome only by (1) 
providing new legislation and regulations definitively acknowledg-
ing that gender-based persecution is encompassed in the refugee 
definition and guiding adjudication of these claims; (2) instituting 
judicial training on gender-based asylum claims; and (3) develop-
ing a tracking mechanism on the adjudicative outcomes of asylum 
claims based on gender. 
Part I discusses the background of U.S. asylum law as it pertains 
to gender-based asylum claims. Part II discusses Matter of A-B- and 
its impact on asylum claims involving intimate partner violence. 
Part III contrasts the lack of forward-thinking on the issue of inti-
mate partner violence within the sea of reform that has occurred 
outside of the asylum context in U.S. criminal and civil remedies 
10. This Article focuses on male-perpetrated intimate partner violence against females. 
Undoubtedly, females may perpetrate intimate partner violence on males and intimate 
partner violence may occur between same-sex couples. However, the majority of intimate 
partner violence perpetrated on the basis of one’s gender is male-on-female. See Rhonda 
Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 291, 303 (1994) (noting that domestic violence is “overwhelmingly initiated by 
men and inflicted upon women”); see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on 
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, pt. 1, ¶ 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Gender Guidelines] (“Gender-related 
claims may be brought by either women or men, although due to particular types of perse-
cution, they are more commonly brought by women.”); CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NCJ 197838, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME 
DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (finding that eighty-five percent of victimizations by intimate partners in 
the United States were against women).
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currently addressing intimate partner violence. Part IV suggests a 
new framework incorporating the principles of these civil and 
criminal reforms, as well as solutions to the primary barriers to asy-
lum claims involving intimate partner violence, to provide guid-
ance to adjudicators and consistency and predictability in the U.S. 
approach. 
I. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
A. The Structure of the U.S. Asylum Law System
The United States system governing immigration and asylum is 
more convoluted than an ordinary judicial or executive system. 
The U.S. immigration system as it exists today has its foundations 
in the creation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS).11 The INS was established in 1933 by executive order to ad-
minister and enforce federal immigration laws and regulations.12
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the INS Service and 
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).13 This reor-
ganization resulted in the division of jurisdiction over asylum 
claims between two agencies: DHS and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ).14 Each agency has the power to promulgate asylum regula-
tions, which are duplicated at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (DHS) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208 (DOJ).15 DHS oversees U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), where affirmative asylum claims are adjudicated, 
and represents the government in removal cases, including those 
before immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA).16 The DOJ, through the Executive Office for Immigration 
11. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS HISTORY OFFICE AND LIBRARY,
OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 7, 11 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf.
12. The INS was originally an agency of the Department of Labor but later reorganized 
as an agency of the Department of Justice in 1940. Id. at 7–8.
13. Id. at 11.
14. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2548; see also Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia Da-
vid, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 337, 355–56 (2009) (discussing the creation and reorganization of agencies 
with jurisdiction over asylum and their regulations).
15. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2548; see also Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14.
16. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 100.1, 208.2, 1103.3, .4, .7 (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2009); 
Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14 (2009).
WINTER 2019] Critiquing Matter of A-B- 349
Review, oversees immigration courts and the BIA.17 The Attorney 
General appoints immigration judges to preside over immigration 
court proceedings.18 In immigration court, an immigration judge 
may adjudicate asylum claims denied by USCIS de novo or asylum 
claims asserted in defense to removal.19
The BIA is the highest administrative body, comprised of up to 
twenty-one board members appointed by the Attorney General, 
which interprets and applies immigration laws.20 In this capacity, 
the BIA has jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of immigra-
tion judges, including asylum determinations, and must exercise 
independent judgment in hearing those appeals.21 The BIA’s deci-
sions are binding on immigration judges as well as officers of the 
DHS.22 However, the Attorney General has the power to modify or 
overrule decisions of the BIA through certification.23 The U.S. cir-
cuit courts may review BIA decisions as an administrative body as 
well as the determinations of the Attorney General as an agency 
head.24
An asylum application may be made affirmatively with USCIS if 
the person is not in removal proceedings.25 These cases are adjudi-
cated by asylum officers within the USCIS. If a person is in removal 
proceedings, she may file a defensive asylum application with the 
immigration court in removal proceedings.26 An asylum applicant 
17. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14, 1003.0 (2018); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14; see also About 
the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last updated 
Aug. 14, 2018).
18. Immigration Judge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
tools/glossary/immigration-judge (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
19. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2548.
20. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2018).
24. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 230 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing National Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
25. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-
united-states (last updated Oct. 19, 2015). If USCIS denies the application, the applicant 
may make an asylum application with the immigration court in removal proceedings. Id.
26. Id. An expedited removal process exists for individuals arriving in the United States 
who are inadmissible. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018). This pro-
cess allows for the removal of the individual from the United States without hearing or re-
view. However, in the expedited removal process, an individual who indicates an intention 
to seek asylum or fear of persecution must be given a “credible fear” interview with a USCIS 
asylum officer. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). Under this 
process, an immigration officer from USCIS is allowed to conduct a preliminary interview of 
an asylum applicant to determine whether the applicant has a “credible fear” of persecution 
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may appeal the decisions of the immigration judge to the BIA and 
the decisions of the BIA to the U.S. circuit court in which the im-
migration judge sits.27
The standard of review for determinations of the Attorney Gen-
eral and administrative bodies, such as the BIA, is highly deferen-
tial. The U.S. circuit courts are required to give deference to the 
agency’s interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, including its definition of membership in 
a particular social group set forth in Matter of M-E-V-G-.28 However, 
the Attorney General and the BIA cannot “adjudicate claims of so-
cial group status inconsistently, or irrationally” or “generate erratic, 
irreconcilable interpretations of their governing statutes.”29 In de-
termining whether the interpretation is “reasonable,” “consistency 
over time and across subjects is a relevant factor.”30
Although U.S. circuit courts may conduct a de novo review of is-
sues of law, issues of fact are reviewed under the substantial-
evidence test.31 A decision by the BIA or the Attorney General will 
be upheld if, considering the record as a whole, it is supported by 
or torture. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018). A credible fear is 
defined as a “significant possibility” that the applicant “could establish eligibility for asylum.”
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). If the asylum officer finds that the ap-
plicant does not have a credible fear, the applicant may seek review of the determination by 
an immigration judge, but the immigration judge’s decision in general cannot be appealed 
with limited exceptions. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) 
(2018); 8 C.F.R. §1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2018); INA § 242(e), 8 U.S.C. §1252(e) (2018). If 
the asylum officer determines the applicant has such a credible fear, he or she may present 
their asylum claim to an immigration judge in the standard removal process. INA § 
235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iv) (2018).
27. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: HOW TO FILE A PETITION 
FOR REVIEW 2 (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
practice_advisory/how_to_file_a_petition_for_review_2015_update.pdf.
28. See National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005) (finding that under Chevron if a statute is ambiguous, and if the agency’s inter-
pretation of the statute is reasonable, the court must accept the agency’s interpretation, but 
“unexplained inconsistency” in an agency’s interpretation is “a reason for holding an inter-
pretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843-44 (1984) (finding that if the intent of Congress on an issue is unambiguous, an 
agency must follow that intent, but if a statute is ambiguous on an issue, “the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 230 (recognizing that a reviewing court must respect 
an agency’s “reasonable interpretation” of the law).
29. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Mar-
molejo–Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting), and 
citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30).
30. Id.
31. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43; Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 
542 (7th Cir. 2011)).
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reasonable, substantial and probative evidence.32 The record must 
compel reversal for the U.S. circuit courts to reverse factual find-
ings of the BIA meaning “a reasonable fact finder would have to 
conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.”33
B. Definition of Refugee in U.S. and International Law34
The United States’ definition of refugee is largely based on the 
international law definition, derived from the 1951 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and 1967 Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). The 1951 
Convention is a United Nations treaty,35 which provided the first 
internationally accepted definition of a refugee. Drawn in the af-
termath of World War II, the 1951 Convention’s definition was in-
fluenced by the politically, racially, and religiously motivated per-
secution inflicted by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.36 The 
1951 Convention refugee definition limited its protection to Euro-
pean refugees after World War II; the 1967 Protocol removed the 
time and geographical limitations contained in the 1951 Conven-
tion and expanded its scope.37
32. Cece, 733 F.3d at 669 (quoting Escobar, 657 F.3d at 545).
33. INS. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citing NLRB v. Columbian Enamel-
ing & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)).
34. This Article focuses on asylum as a path for relief, which may provide protection for 
women who flee intimate partner violence in their countries. However, other paths for relief 
may include withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and withholding of removal under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 8 
C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 1208.16 (2018); see INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018).
Withholding of removal requires a higher standard demonstrating that an applicant would 
“more likely than not” suffer persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion” in the proposed country of removal. 8 
C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b), 1208.16(b). In contrast, asylum requires a “well-founded fear” of future 
persecution on account of these same grounds. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b), 1208.13(b) (2013).
The Convention Against Torture requires the applicant to show that it is “more likely than 
not” that she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16(c), 1205.16(c) (2000). Further, while these withholding of removal paths may 
provide temporary relief, unlike asylum, they do not make an individual eligible for perma-
nent residency or citizenship.
35. The 1951 Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
36. See, e.g., Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Unequal Protection, 58 BULL. ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS 56, 59 (2002); Stephanie Robins, Note, Backing It Up: Real ID’s Impact on the Cor-
roboration Standard in Women’s Private Asylum Claims, 35 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 435, 442–43 
(2014).
37. The 1967 Protocol defines the term “refugee” as a person who:
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The United States became a party to the 1967 Protocol in 1968. 
Congress then passed the Refugee Act of 1980 and incorporated 
the provisions—including the definition of a refugee—of the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol into the Immigration and National-
ity Act in order to bring the country into compliance with its obli-
gations under the 1967 Protocol.38 Under the Act, a refugee is de-
fined as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.39 Race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion are 
commonly referred to as “Convention reasons,” “Convention 
grounds,” or “the five categories/grounds” for asylum or refugee 
status.40 The United States refers to persons who meet the defini-
tion of refugee who are outside the United States as “refugees” and 
persons who meet the definition of refugee who are inside the 
United States as “asylees.”41
The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have historically been 
interpreted without regard to the unique protection needs of 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorpo-
rating in part the 1951 Convention’s definition of “refugee”); see 1951 Convention supra 
note 35, ch. 1, art. 1A(2), at 152.
38. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427–29, 436–37 (1987).
39. Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a “refu-
gee” is:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the 
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such per-
son last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is un-
able or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b),
1208.13(b) (2018).
40. See, e.g., Marsden, supra note 3, at 2518 (referring to “five protected grounds”); Mu-
salo, supra note 3, at 783 (referencing “Convention reason,” “five . . . grounds,” and “Con-
vention grounds”); Melanie Randall, Particularized Social Groups and Categorical Imperatives in 
Refugee Law: State Failures to Recognize Gender and the Legal Reception of Gender Persecution Claims 
in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 529, 
531, 542 (2015) (referring to “five protected grounds” and “convention ground”).
41. Refugees & Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATIONS SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum (last updated Nov. 12, 2015).
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women asylum seekers.42 The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), in its Guidelines on International Protection: 
Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
has also acknowledged that traditionally “the refugee definition 
has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences.”43
In response, the United Nations, individual countries, non-
governmental organizations, academics, and practitioners, among 
others, have made significant efforts in the last thirty years to ad-
dress gender-based asylum, including asylum claims based on inti-
mate partner violence.44
Even before Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s recent decision 
questioning the viability of asylum claims involving intimate part-
ner violence, many women asylum seekers who have experienced 
intimate partner violence historically encountered specific barriers 
to obtaining asylum status in the United States. This difficulty can 
be attributed to a combination of interpretive issues related to the 
refugee definition,45 fears of opening the floodgates,46 and a lack of 
training for adjudicators on asylum claims related to intimate part-
ner violence.47
42. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 3, at 780.
43. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 2.
44. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 3, at 777–79, 781–82 (referring to the progress made on
women’s claims in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia); Karen Musalo, A Short 
History of Gender Asylum in the United States Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly be Inching 
Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46, 49 (2010) reprinted in U.C.
HASTINGS SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2010) [hereinafter Musalo, A Short History] (stating 
that in 1985, the UNHCR and its Executive Committee began issuing guidance on the in-
terpretative barriers to the protection of refugee women); Musalo & Knight, supra note 36,
at 57–59 (recognizing that advocates have made significant progress toward the recognition 
of women’s rights and momentum for the protection of women refugees is growing); Ran-
dall, supra note 40, at 532 (acknowledging advancements in the reception of women’s asy-
lum claims).
45. See Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82.
46. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to 
(Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132 (2007) (“Perhaps the overarching basis 
for the opposition to gender claims is the fear that acceptance of these cases will result in 
the floodgates.”); see also Marsden, supra note 3, at 2553–55 (“One criticism that has been 
leveled at proposals to make it easier for women to seek asylum on the basis of domestic vio-
lence is that doing so will open a “floodgate” of female asylum-seekers to the United
States.”).
47. See Barbara R. Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past, Present, and 
Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. REV. 225, 266–68 (2011) 
(asserting that training for adjudicators, requiring the review of Department of State Hu-
man Rights Reports and updates on the status of intimate partner asylum claims are “small 
steps” that should be taken to ensure intimate partner violence asylum claims are properly 
adjudicated); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14, at 372–73 (arguing that if adjudicators do 
not understand the complex dynamics of abusive relationships, new regulations cannot as-
sist adjudicators in the assessment of asylum claims involving intimate partner violence).
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Three primary interpretative issues regularly arise for women 
asylum seekers in satisfying the threshold requirements in asylum 
proceedings.48 First, women may be persecuted on the basis of 
their gender, which is not included as one of the five categories in 
the 1951 Convention to be protected from targeted persecution 
(race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, and political opinion).49 Rather, immigration judges’
recognition of gender-based claims has followed a disturbing pat-
tern of “particularization”50 under the “particular social group”
category. This means rather than using a more general common 
characteristic which may define a group, the group is further di-
vided in to several subsets of common characteristics. For example, 
rather than refer to “women,” an immigration judge might refer to 
“[i]ndigenous Guatemalan women perceived as the property of 
and suffering domestic violence at the hands of their intimate 
partners, and who are unable to safely leave the relationship.”51
This particularization ignores the fact that the persecution is car-
ried out because of gender itself as opposed to gender plus other 
characteristics.52
Second, although the refugee definition was formed recognizing 
public acts of persecution inflicted by the state, it did not make any 
specific considerations for persecution that occurs in private and is
perpetrated by private actors.53 While male asylum seekers’ claims 
often involve a state actor, such as a government entity or police, 
women asylum seekers’ claims more regularly involve private or 
non-state actors including intimate partners, fathers, or other male 
relatives.54 Under U.S. law, an asylum applicant who suffers perse-
cution inflicted by a non-state actor must also demonstrate that the 
state is unable and unwilling to provide protection.55 This makes 
48. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82.
49. Id.; see also Randall, supra note 40, at 531.
50. Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A 
Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecu-
tion, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 292 (2002).
51. See Jeronimo v. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 799 (11th Cir. 2017).
52. Randall, supra note 50.
53. Id. at 305–06; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the 
International Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 9 (2006) (“The threshold legal barrier to 
addressing male violence against women internationally has been that both the perpetrators 
and the victims are private persons, termed nonstate actors.”).
54. See Robins, supra note 36, at 436–37; Musalo, A Short History, supra note 44, at 49.
55. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
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corroboration of persecution in non-state actor asylum cases much 
more difficult.56
Third, the harms suffered by women are often different from 
those suffered by men.57 These harms may be accepted by the soci-
ety or culture.58 For instance, intimate partner violence is a harm 
that primarily is inflicted on women rather than men.59 That wom-
en are disproportionately affected by this harm has impacted de-
terminations as to whether women who suffer this harm fall under 
one of the five categories to be protected from persecution, in par-
ticular political opinion and particular social group categories.60
Further, because women experience intimate partner violence in 
every country, this fosters the view of intimate partner violence as a 
private criminal matter outside the scope of the refugee defini-
tion.61 However, this perception ignores the fact that many socie-
ties and cultures accept intimate partner violence against women 
because of their gender and, for this reason, these women may 
meet the requirements of the refugee definition.62 These interpre-
tive issues significantly and negatively impact the adjudication of 
women’s asylum claims involving intimate partner violence. 
Gender is the most critical aspect of an asylum claim based on 
intimate partner violence in that it is at once the immutable char-
acteristic forming a particular social group,63 the nexus between 
56. Robins, supra note 36 (asserting that persecution occurs in private places where 
government actors are not present and governments may not be motivated to interfere in 
private, family matters, so it can be difficult for women to corroborate their asylum claims).
57. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10.
60. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335 (“Social groups defined by their vulnerability to 
private criminal activity likely lack the particularity required under M-E-V-G-, given that
broad swaths of society may be susceptible to victimization.”); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 
916 (A.G. 2001) (“As we understand the respondent’s rationale, it would seem that virtually 
any victim of repeated violence who offers some resistance could qualify for asylum, particu-
larly where the government did not control the assailant.”); Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82, 
782 n.32.
61. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335; In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 916; UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines, supra note 10.
62. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 
929–46 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); Supplemental Brief for Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. at 14–15, In re L-R- (B.I.A. 2009), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/
files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf [hereinafter DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief] 
(certain docket information redacted); Brief for Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Position on Re-
spondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 5, 26–28, In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005) (No. A
73 753 922), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-
%20DHS%20brief.pdf [hereinafter DHS R-A- Brief].
63. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014) overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 316; see also In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that the 
shared characteristic of “sex” may form the basis for a particular social group and persecu-
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the harm (intimate partner violence) and the particular social 
group (namely, women),64 and the basis for the government’s ina-
bility or unwillingness to protect the victim (entrenched misogyny 
and systemic sexism).65 In particular, asylum claims by women in-
volving intimate partner violence have issues arising out of three 
key elements of this refugee definition: (1) past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, (2) on account of (“nex-
us”), (3) membership in a particular social group. The following is 
a description of these elements.
1. Persecution
Neither U.S. law nor the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol provide a definition of persecution.66 However, the BIA 
has recognized two aspects of the term “persecution”:
(1) harm or suffering is inflicted upon the individual in or-
der to punish her for possessing a belief or characteristic a 
persecutor sought to overcome; and 
(2) harm or suffering was inflicted either by government 
actors or by persons or an organization that the govern-
ment was unable or unwilling to control.67
When government actors inflict the persecution, the applicant 
need not demonstrate that she reported the harm to the police or 
other state actors.68 However, if non-governmental actors are the 
persecutors, the applicant must demonstrate that the government 
tion may be directed towards an individual because of her membership in such a group),
overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
64. See Marsden, supra note 3. See generally Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82 (describing, 
in the context of gender asylum claims, the nexus requirement between the particular social 
group and the harm at issue).
65. See Musalo, supra note 3, at 797–806 (discussing several jurisdictions that have rec-
ognized the causal link between gender-related persecution and the inability or unwilling-
ness of the state to offer protection).
66. See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation as Ground for 
Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In re Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender 
Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 375, 378 (1997); E. Dana Neacsu, Gender 
Based Persecution as a Basis for Asylum: An Annotated Bibliography, 1993–2002, 95 L. LIBR. J. 191, 
193 (2003); U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status at 13, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3 (2011).
67. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222.
68. Joline Doedens, The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 22 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 111, 114 (2014) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2013); Baballah v. 
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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was unable or unwilling to protect her after reporting the persecu-
tion or that reporting the persecution would be “futile” because 
the government has failed to protect others who have made similar 
reports.69
If a person has shown that she has been persecuted in the past, a 
presumption exists that she also has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution if returned to her country of nationality or habitual resi-
dence.70 Thus, the DHS will then bear the burden to overcome the 
presumption by proving either a “fundamental change of circum-
stances” eliminating the person’s well-founded fear or that it is rea-
sonable for the person to escape persecution by relocating in her 
country of nationality or habitual residence.71 Nevertheless, an ap-
plicant need not have suffered past persecution if she can establish 
that she has a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.72
2. Nexus
Once an applicant has established a well-founded fear of perse-
cution, she must show that it is on account of one of the five enu-
merated grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.73 This is referred to as the 
“nexus” between persecution and one of the five protected 
69. Id. at 113–15 (citing IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, ESSENTIALS OF ASYLUM 
LAW 1-1 (2d ed. 2013); Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also In 
re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365
(B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing that “persecution can consist of the infliction of harm or suffer-
ing by . . . persons a government is unwilling or unable to control.”); Memorandum from 
Phyllis Coven, Director, INS Office of International Affairs, to all INS Asylum Officers and 
HQASM Coordinators 17 (May 26, 1995), reprinted in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 781 (1995) 
[hereinafter Coven Memorandum]; Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The 
Asylum Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1230–31 
(2009) (citing Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006)).
70. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1) (2018).
71. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i), 1208.13(b)(1)(i) (2018).
72. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2), 1208.13(b)(2) (2018). In order to establish a “well-
founded” fear of persecution:
the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the [individual] possesses a belief or 
characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment 
of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, 
that the [individual] possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has 
the capability of punishing the [individual]; and (4) the persecutor has the incli-
nation to punish the [individual].
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. 
& N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
73. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)–(2), 
1208.13(b)(1)–(2); see Musalo, supra note 3, at 781.
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grounds.74 In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which re-
quired that the applicant demonstrate that one of the five protect-
ed grounds is “at least one central reason for persecuting the ap-
plicant.”75
3. Particular Social Group as One of the 
Five Enumerated Grounds
The “particular social group” category was created in order to 
include groups of persons who may not fall under one of other 
grounds for asylum but are deserving of protection.76 Yet, its draft-
ers did not define particular social group at its inception.77 As a re-
sult, confusing interpretations of the particular social group cate-
gory and applications of those interpretations to the facts of each 
case has plagued asylum claims based on membership in a particu-
lar social group. This is particularly true in asylum claims involving 
persecution based on gender, such as intimate partner violence. 
The Attorney General’s determination in Matter of A-B- is one of 
the most recent demonstrations of the confusing interpretation of 
the particular social group category and its application in a gender-
based asylum case involving intimate partner violence. As gender is 
not one of the five enumerated grounds for asylum, it has primari-
ly been considered under the particular social group ground. In 
early interpretations of the particular social group category, gen-
der constituted an immutable characteristic, which could form a 
particular social group.78
74. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781.
75. Doedens, supra note 68, at 116–17 (citing REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018)); Robins, supra note 36, at 441–42.
76. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2517.
77. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232 (“Congress did not indicate what it under-
stood [membership in a particular social group] to mean, nor is its meaning clear.”).
78. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that women in Iran 
could constitute a particular social group); see also Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034 
(8th Cir. 2008) (Cameroonian widows); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 
2007) (Somali females); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (female 
tribe members). For a discussion of cases recognizing that gender or sex may constitute a 
social group, see Brief of The Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program et al. as 
Amici Curiae, at 7–8, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://
uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291242765358.
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C. Interpretation of “Particular Social Group” as 
One of the Five Convention Grounds
Using the doctrine of ejusdem generis79 in 1985, the BIA initially 
interpreted the particular social group category in Matter of Acosta
as 
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a 
member of a group of persons all of whom share a com-
mon, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic 
might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, 
or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experi-
ence such as former military leadership or land owner-
ship.80
The determination is made on a case-by-case basis, but the char-
acteristic must be either “beyond the power of an individual to
change or . . . so fundamental to individual identity or conscience 
that it ought not be required to be changed.”81 Since Matter of 
Acosta, the definition of the particular social group category has 
undergone a significant evolution.82
In 2008, the BIA formally added the requirements of “particular-
ity” and “social visibility” to its interpretation of a particular social 
group in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-.83 The Third and Sev-
enth Circuits refused to recognize the BIA’s new “particularity”
and “social visibility” requirements, finding them to be inconsistent 
with prior BIA determinations, confusing, and an unnecessary ad-
dition to the social group test set forth in Acosta.84 In Matter of M-E-
79. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“[G]eneral words used in an enumeration 
with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words.”).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 233–34.
82. See generally Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Re-
quirements of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 355, 367–379 (2015) (discussing the judicial treatment of the Acosta standard in the 
years following the decision); Kenneth Ludlum, Note, Defining Membership in a Particular So-
cial Group: The Search for a Uniform Approach to Adjudicating Asylum Applications in the United 
States, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115, 119–24 (2015) (discussing the history of interpretation of the 
particular social group category since Acosta).
83. In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 
(B.I.A. 2008).
84. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that “the breadth 
of category has never been a per se bar to protected status” and finding the BIA’s decision 
inconsistent with its own precedent following Matter of Acosta, which had established the test 
for whether a social group is cognizable); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 
603–06 (3d Cir. 2011) (directing the BIA to clarify the requirements of “particularity” and 
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V-G-, the BIA attempted to provide further explanation of its inter-
pretation of the particular social group category.85 Although the 
BIA included Matter of Acosta’s common, immutable characteristic 
requirement in its definition, it clarified two additional require-
ments in establishing a particular social group.86As explained by 
the BIA in Matter of M-E-V-G-, a particular social group must be: (1) 
composed of members who share a common immutable character-
istic (Matter of Acosta test), (2) defined with particularity, and (3) 
socially distinct within the society in question.87
Regarding particularity, the BIA expounded that a particular so-
cial group “must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear 
benchmark for determining who falls within the group” and must 
have “discrete” and “definable boundaries.”88 The BIA renamed 
“social visibility” as “social distinction” and clarified that it signifies 
that a society considers the members to comprise a group regard-
less of whether the group’s members can be identified by sight.89
Although the BIA recognized that these requirements might over-
lap, it argued that “particularity” is focused on the outer limits of 
the group’s boundaries and “social visibility” on whether a society 
would perceive a proposed group as separate or distinct.90 At the 
same time, it acknowledged that societal considerations were im-
portant to both requirements.91
Scholars have argued that the addition of the requirements of 
“particularity” and “social distinction” to the interpretation of a 
particular social group is inconsistent with the principle of ejusdem 
“social visibility” after finding their usage was inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and not 
entitled to Chevron deference); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We 
just don’t see what work ‘social visibility’ does.”).
85. On remand, the BIA defended its decision by asserting that it had not created new 
requirements to its interpretation of “particular social groups”; rather, it had simply provid-
ed the term with more “concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.”
In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); see also In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 239 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007)).
89. Id. at 240.
90. Id. at 241.
91. Id. The Third Circuit has found that the BIA adequately articulated why it under-
stood “social visibility” and “particularity” to be separate requirements for establishing a 
cognizable social group. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 553 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing In re 
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239–41, 244). Notably, the Seventh Circuit has not accepted 
these articulations of “particularity” and “social distinction” and thus far has declined to de-
termine whether these requirements are entitled to Chevron deference. See, e.g., Cece v. 
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674 (7th Cir. 2013); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 
2009).
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generis as they compel consideration of more than common immu-
table characteristics required by race, religion, nationality, and po-
litical opinion.92 Further, the BIA’s “particularity” and “social dis-
tinction” requisites for demonstrating the existence of a particular 
social group have been one of the causes of the inconsistent de-
terminations in asylum cases of women who have suffered persecu-
tion in the form of intimate partner violence.93 This is because so-
cietal considerations and perceptions are essential to both 
requirements of particularity and social distinction.94 A society may 
not recognize intimate partner violence as a problem in their 
country due to its hidden nature within the society, its social ac-
ceptability, or its insignificance in the society due to the subordina-
tion of women.95
That women from certain countries who suffer intimate partner 
violence may have a viable asylum claim is not new to the U.S. im-
migration system. In fact, the INS recognized it as early as 1995. In 
her May 26, 1995, memorandum to INS asylum officials, the Direc-
tor of the INS Office of International Affairs, Phyllis Coven, ex-
plained that domestic violence is a form of harm “primarily di-
rected” at women and “may serve as evidence of past persecution 
on account of one or more of the five grounds” for asylum.96
The following sections discuss the seminal cases that provide in-
terpretations of a particular social group as applied to gender-
based claims, including those involving intimate partner violence. 
D. Matter of Kasinga: Interpretation of Particular Social Group as 
Applied to Gender-Based Claims
One of the most important BIA decisions analyzing the particu-
lar social group category in a gender-based asylum claim is Matter of 
Kasinga, decided in 1996.97 In Matter of Kasinga, the nineteen-year-
92. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular 
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 105 (2008); Liliya Paraketsova, Note, Why Guidance from the Su-
preme Court is Required in Redefining the Particular Social Group Definition in Refugee Law, 51 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 449–50 (2018).
93. Elizabeth Zambrana, The Social Distinction of “Invisible” Harms: How Recent Develop-
ments in the Particular Social Group Standard Fall Short for Victims of Gender-Based Harms Commit-
ted by Private Actors, 36 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 236, 259–64 (2015).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Coven Memorandum, supra note 69, § II(a).
97. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
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old applicant was a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe in 
northern Togo. Women in her tribe were forced to undergo fe-
male genital mutilation (FGM) at around fifteen years old. Ms. 
Kasinga, however, had not been subjected to FGM because her fa-
ther had protected her from the practice. Her father later died. 
Following his death, Ms. Kasinga’s mother was forced to leave To-
go, and Ms. Kasinga went to live with her father’s sister. Her aunt 
forced her to marry a man with three other wives when she was 
seventeen. Her husband and her aunt then made plans for her to
undergo FGM according to tribal custom. 
The applicant, fearing that she would be forced to undergo 
FGM, eventually fled to the United States asking for asylum once 
she reached the airport.98 She claimed a well-founded fear of per-
secution on the grounds of her membership in a particular social 
group made up of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe 
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose 
the practice.”99 Using the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social 
group” in Matter of Acosta, the BIA found that the “characteristics of 
being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
Tribe’ cannot be changed. The characteristic of having intact geni-
talia is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a 
young woman that she should not be required to change it.”100
The BIA found that FGM is practiced on account of sexual char-
acteristics of young women of the tribe who do not want to be sub-
jected to FGM.101 FGM constituted “sexual oppression” derived 
from society’s purpose in promoting “male dominance and exploi-
tation.”102 Her fear of persecution was countrywide as her husband 
was a friend of the police, FGM was widely practiced, police toler-
ated violence towards women, Togo had a poor human rights rec-
ord, and “most African women [could] expect little government 
protection from FGM.”103 Kasinga was found to have a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of a particular social group, her 
fear was determined to be countrywide, and thus, she was granted 
asylum.104
Although not identified as such in Kasinga, Karen Musalo has 
pointed out that the BIA employed the bifurcated analysis used by 
98. Id. at 359.
99. Id. at 365.
100. Id. at 366.
101. Id. at 367.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 368.
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the British House of Lords and the UNHCR.105 The bifurcated 
analysis recognizes that persecution on account of a particular so-
cial group, or nexus, may be evidenced if: (1) the non-state actor 
persecutes the woman based on her membership in a particular 
social group or (2) the state is unwilling or unable to offer protec-
tion from the persecution based on her membership in a particu-
lar social group.106 Since the problem for women who are persecut-
ed is finding a nexus between the non-state actor’s persecution and
the particular social group ground, the bifurcated analysis has al-
lowed the United Kingdom and other countries107 to give protec-
tion to women despite the nexus problem. The approach allows 
the consideration of not only the motives of the persecutor, but al-
so takes into account the state’s or society’s involvement in the per-
secution by establishing the “causal connection” between the par-
ticular social group ground and the non-state perpetrator or the 
state/society.108 This bifurcated analysis is especially important as it 
provides “an analytical path around the barrier created by the 
characterization of family violence as ‘personal’ rather than as a 
Convention reason.”109
Although the social group identified by the BIA included “gen-
der, ethnicity, and opposition to FGM,” no decision was made as to 
whether the social group could be comprised of gender alone. 
Nevertheless, Kasinga continues to be one of the most important 
105. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–87. In Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 
AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.), the applicants were citizens of Pakistan and risked 
being falsely accused of adultery in Pakistan. They fled to the United Kingdom and applied 
for asylum claiming that the state would not provide protection and, if returned, they would 
be subjected to criminal proceedings for sexual immorality. The House of Lords found that 
the women were members of a gender-related social group and, while their husbands did 
not abuse them on the grounds of their membership in this group, the State was unwilling 
to protect them due to their gender. Through this approach, the nexus between the perse-
cution and the particular social group was established. Three of the four Lords of the major-
ity defined the social group as “women in Pakistan” while the fourth described it as Pakistani 
women who are accused of adultery and have no State protection. The State’s failure to pro-
vide protection to these women from persecution by their husbands fulfilled the required 
nexus to the ground of a particular social group. Id. at 787–89.
In Matter of Kasinga, the BIA found that there was a nexus between FGM and a particu-
lar social group based on gender. Karen Musalo analogizes the finding in Kasinga that FGM 
constituted “sexual oppression” derived from society’s purpose in promoting “male domi-
nance and exploitation” to the findings in Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 
629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). Musalo, supra note 3, at 800–01. The BIA in Kasinga 
recognized that the nexus between persecution and particular social group status could be 
established “not solely by reference to the individual perpetrators of [the harm], but within 
a broader societal context.” Id.
106. Musalo, supra note 3, at 783–87.
107. See id. at 777.
108. Id. at 777–79.
109. Id. at 790.
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authorities analyzing a gender-based asylum claim.110 The decision 
in Kasinga has continued to be validated by the BIA, including un-
der the new three-part test required to establish a particular social 
group clarified in Matter of M-E-V-G-.111
As discussed further below, the Attorney General’s recent de-
termination in Matter of A-B- is void of any substantive discussion of 
Matter of Kasinga. If the analysis of the Attorney General were to be 
employed in Kasinga today, it is uncertain whether Ms. Kasinga 
could establish that she was a member of a cognizable social group, 
a nexus between the persecution and the social group, that the 
government was unable or unwilling to provide protection to her, 
or that her fear of persecution was countrywide. The possibility 
that gender-based asylum claims involving FGM may not meet the 
Attorney General’s interpretation of the refugee definition is 
alarming and further evidences his confusing and flawed analysis 
of a gender-based asylum claim. 
E. Interpretation of the Particular Social Group Category as Applied to 
Victims of Intimate Partner Violence
1. Matter of R-A-112
The history of inconsistent and even erratic adjudications in asy-
lum cases based on gender and intimate partner relationships as 
particular social groups is well documented.113 Particularly, in 2000, 
the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- roused significant controversy 
and impeded progress in gender-related asylum claims.114 In that 
case, the applicant, Ms. Alvarado, a citizen of Guatemala who was 
married, claimed abhorrent physical and sexual abuse.115
110. Id. at 798 (“Significant for purposes of this analysis, however, is the fact that the va-
cating of Matter of R-A- leaves Matter of Kasinga as the most relevant authority on gender asy-
lum claims. It is on this basis that the unifying rationale of a bifurcated nexus analysis can be 
reinvigorated.”).
111. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 238 (B.I.A. 2014).
112. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001).
113. See, e.g., Barreno, supra note 47, at 231–50; Musalo, supra note 3.
114. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2529.
115. The immigration judge found that the applicant was persecuted by her husband on 
account of her membership in a particular social group, and the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service subsequently appealed the decision to the BIA. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 
906–09.
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Although the BIA acknowledged that Ms. Alvarado had estab-
lished that the harm she had suffered amounted to persecution, it 
found that she failed to establish her membership in a particular 
social group comprised of “Guatemalan women who have been in-
volved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe 
women are to live under male domination.”116 The BIA reasoned 
that the interpretation of what forms a particular social group in 
Matter of Acosta is only a starting point.117 “Shared descriptive char-
acteristics” are not enough to constitute a particular social group.
If that were all that needed to be shown, “the social group concept 
would virtually swallow the entire refugee definition.”118 In an early 
formulation of the “social visibility”/“social distinction” require-
ment discussed above, the BIA explained that the applicant had
not shown that the identified particular social group was a recog-
nized segment of the society, that the society expected women to 
be abused, or the “prominence or importance” of the characteris-
tics of the proposed particular social group within the society.119
Further, the BIA found that Ms. Alvarado failed to demonstrate 
the requisite nexus, meaning that her husband abused her on ac-
count of her membership in the particular social group.120 Rather,
he targeted her because she was his wife and not because he rec-
ognized that she was a part of the social group.121 In particular, the 
BIA rejected the argument that a government’s failure to provide 
effective protection is a “reliable indicator of the motivations be-
hind the actions of private parties.”122 Although the government 
may have tolerated the abuse inflicted upon the applicant by her 
husband, this did not prove that the Guatemalan government sup-
ports domestic violence and abuse.123 In addition, the BIA stated 
that by equating “private acts of violence” with “governmental per-
secution” when protection is ineffective would render the “‘on ac-
count of’ requirement” meaningless.124
The BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- was widely criticized, which 
led the INS to draft amended regulations on the particular social 
116. Id. at 917–18.
117. Id. at 919.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 920–21.
121. Id. at 921.
122. Id. at 922.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 923.
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group category that specifically addressed gender-related issues.125
The INS published the proposed rule that would amend the regu-
lations in 2000.126 In 2001, Attorney General Janet Reno vacated 
the BIA’s decision in R-A- and remanded the case back to the BIA 
for reconsideration after the regulations were finalized.127 In 2004, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft certified Matter of R-A- to himself,
and DHS filed a brief supporting a grant of asylum.128 In DHS’s
2004 brief, it argued that the BIA’s decision in R-A-—rejecting the 
existence of a particular social group and the nexus between the 
persecution and the particular social group—to be “flawed and, if 
reinstated as precedent, would impede rational, coherent devel-
opment of particular social group law.”129
DHS acknowledged that women who fear domestic violence may 
meet the requirements for asylum.130 In particular, DHS recognized 
that “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the re-
lationship” would meet the requirements for a particular social 
group.131 Ms. Alvarado’s husband abused her on account of her 
membership in this group because he believed, as his wife, she was 
subordinate to him.132 Social norms in Guatemala supported this 
belief and, as such, his abuse was tolerated by the Guatemalan gov-
ernment and society.133
125. See, e.g., Barreno, supra note 47, at 238 (discussing the drafting of amended regula-
tions by the INS); Marsden, supra note 3, at 2529 (explaining that the holding was “immedi-
ately criticized”).
126. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
127. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec at 906.
128. See generally DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62.
129. Id. at 15.
130. See generally id.
131. Id. at 26–28.
132. Id. at 36.
133. Id. at 40–42. Additionally, the dissent in Matter of R-A- is particularly instructive in 
addressing the flawed analysis of the BIA majority opinion. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 
929–946 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting).
The applicant suffered harm in part due to the government’s inaction and refusal to 
intervene. The dissent highlighted the findings of the immigration judge that the institu-
tional biases in Guatemala derive from “‘a pervasive belief, common in patriarchal societies, 
that a man should be able to control a wife or female companion by any means he sees fit: 
including rape, torture, and beatings.’” Id. at 930. On account of this societal belief that 
men should control their wife or female companion coupled with the fact that domestic 
abuse is considered a family matter, abusive husbands or partners are not brought to justice 
and protection is unavailable to victims. Id. The dissent argued that the applicant has a 
“fundamental right” to protection from abuse on account of her gender. Id. at 931. In the 
situation that domestic abuse occurs in combination with state acquiescence, the victim 
should be protected under asylum law.
Concerning the nexus between the persecution and one of the five protected grounds, 
the dissent appeared to support the bifurcated analysis put forth in Islam v. Sec’y of State for 
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Ultimately, in 2005, Attorney General Ashcroft, like Attorney 
General Reno, remanded the case to the BIA for consideration 
when the regulations were finalized. The regulations were, in fact, 
never finalized and the case remained stayed by the BIA.134 A third 
attorney general, Michael Mukasey, in 2008, remanded the case to 
the BIA again to reconsider specific issues related to asylum claims 
stemming from domestic violence.135 After ten years and no recon-
sideration on remand, the DHS finally stipulated to Ms. Alvarado’s
eligibility for asylum, and her application was granted by an immi-
gration judge in December 2009.136
Although the BIA’s decision in Matter of R-A- was vacated, and its 
analysis was determined to be flawed even by DHS, Attorney Gen-
eral Sessions utilized much of the analysis of the BIA in Matter of R-
A- in support of his decision in Matter of A-B-. His decision appears 
to be an attempt to return to the rejected analysis of the BIA in 
2000. 
the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.), which had been rejected by 
the majority. Compare In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 935–937 (Guendelsberger, Board Mem-
ber, dissenting) (citing the case with approval), with id. at 920 n.2 (majority opinion) (indi-
cating disapproval of the case’s nexus analysis). The facts clearly provided proof that the 
husband targeted the applicant on the basis of her gender when he used abuse in order to 
affirm his domination over her. The dissent believed that, when addressing nexus, it is im-
portant to consider the “factual circumstances surrounding the violence.” Id. at 938 (Guen-
delsberger, Board Member, dissenting). In addition, the dissent, unlike the majority, recog-
nized that the difficulty in determining the husband’s motives only “supports the respond-
respondent’s claim that the harm is ‘on account of’ a protected ground.” Compare id., with id. 
at 916 (majority opinion). The majority, according to the dissent, missed the point that no 
“good reason” actually exists for the husband’s abuse. Id. at 938 (Guendelsberger, Board 
Member, dissenting). The dissent went further to say that “[i]llegitimate motives can give 
rise to an inference that the harm has occurred on account of a statutorily protected charac-
teristic,” such as the applicant’s membership in a particular social group. Id. Finally, the dis-
sent asserted that the BIA should consider the reasons behind this violence. Id. at 939. The 
BIA found that FGM aims to control “women’s sexuality.” Id. Like FGM, domestic violence is 
also a means used by men to subordinate women. Id. The husband in this case acted on ac-
count of the applicant’s gender, their relationship, and the fact that he knew, “as a woman 
subject to his subordination, the respondent would receive no protection from the authori-
ties if she resisted his abuse and persecution.” Id. Applying the bifurcated approach, the dis-
sent would have found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of her membership in the identified social group.
134. See, e.g., Musalo & Knight, supra note 36, at 60 (describing Attorney General Janet 
Reno’s actions in 2001); Barreno, supra note 47, at 237 (describing Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s actions in 2005).
135. See In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 629 (A.G. 2008); see also Musalo & Knight, supra 
note 36, at 59; Barreno, supra note 47, at 237.
136. See Musalo & Knight, supra note 36, at 60; Barreno, supra note 47, at 248.
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2. Matter of L-R-
In 2004, Ms. L-R- fled Mexico to escape twenty years of physical, 
sexual, and mental abuse from her partner.137 He beat and raped 
her repeatedly. In one circumstance after she tried to flee, he 
found her and attempted to burn her alive. Ms. L-R-’s abuser fur-
ther threatened violence against their children to prevent her es-
cape. The police refused to help her, and even a judge asserted 
that he would not help Ms. L-R- unless she had sex with him, which 
she refused to do. When she fled to the United States, she applied 
for asylum. An immigration judge denied her application.
She appealed to the BIA and, similar to its 2004 brief in Matter 
of R-A-, DHS acknowledged that asylum claims involving domestic 
violence could be viable.138 In particular, DHS recognized that par-
ticular social groups, such as “Mexican women in domestic rela-
tionships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who are 
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic re-
lationship” may be cognizable because they meet the immutability, 
particularity, and visibility requirements.139 DHS explained that Ms. 
L-R-’s particular social group is “best defined in light of the evi-
dence about how the respondent’s abuser and her society perceive 
her role within the domestic relationship.”140 DHS found that Ms. 
L-R-’s abuser and surrounding society perceived her role in a do-
mestic relationship as subordinate. The case was remanded to the 
immigration judge, and DHS stipulated that Ms. L-R- was eligible 
for asylum. The immigration judge granted asylum in a summary 
order stating that the grant was a result of the parties’ stipulation. 
Both Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R- represented progress in the 
position taken by DHS recognizing the viability of asylum claims of 
women involving intimate partner violence. However, because 
137. In fact, Ms. L-R- had fled to the U.S. earlier, in 1991, but her partner found her and 
forced her to return, threatening to take away her children and kill her. Matter of L-R-, CTR.
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2019); see also Natalie Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum and the Perpetuation of the Victim-
ization Narrative, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 749–51 (2017).
138. DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 
62.
139. DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 26–
28. DHS explained “This evidence may reflect a societal view, applicable at least in parts of 
Mexico, that the status of a woman in a domestic relationship places the woman into a seg-
ment of society that will not be accorded protection from harm inflicted by a domestic part-
ner. In this light, the female respondent’s status by virtue of her relationship . . . could in-
deed be the kind of important characteristic that results in a significant social distinction 
being drawn in terms of who will receive protection from serious physical harm.” Id. at 18.
140. Nanasi, supra note 137, at 746–51.
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these women were granted asylum in a summary order based on 
the stipulation of the parties, the decisions granting asylum in 
these cases did not provide any precedent for future asylum cases
based on intimate partner violence.141
3. Matter of A-R-C-G-
In 2014, the BIA, for the first time in a published case, recog-
nized that a woman who feared persecution in the form of intimate 
partner violence may meet the requirements of asylum.142 In the 
case, Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA found that the applicant, Ms. 
Cifuentes, was a member of a particular social group composed of 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship.”143 The applicant suffered considerable abuse at the 
hands of her husband; he beat her weekly, broke her nose, burned 
her breast with paint thinner, and raped her.144 She sought protec-
tion from the police many times, but the police told her that they 
would not interfere in a marital relationship.145 Ms. Cifuentes tried 
to leave on a number of occasions, hiding at her father’s house.146
However, each time her husband found her and threatened to kill 
her if she did not return to him.147
The immigration judge denied Ms. Cifuentes’s asylum claim, 
finding that she failed to demonstrate a nexus between her perse-
cution and particular social group. In particular, the immigration 
judge found that she had failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that her husband abused her on account of the fact 
141. See id. at 749, 751.
142. Unpublished decisions of the BIA are generally unavailable to the public. This is a 
basis of a recent lawsuit filed by the New York Legal Assistance Group against the BIA, Exec-
utive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), and DOJ. The BIA provides a hard copy of a 
small percentage of its unpublished decisions in a reading room at the EOIR Law Library 
and Immigration Research Center. See Complaint at 5, N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp. v. BIA, No. 
18-cv-9495 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018), ECF No. 1 (citing EOIR, Library information and FAQs,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/library-faqs (last visited Oct. 15, 2018)); Blaine Bookey, Domes-
tic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 
to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 109–11 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 9 (2017), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1103051/download [hereinafter IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL].
143. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
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that she was a “married woman in Guatemala who was unable to 
leave the relationship.”148 Rather, the immigration judge deter-
mined, the abuse constituted arbitrary criminal acts.149 In Ms. 
Cifuentes’s appeal to the BIA, the DHS conceded that she had suf-
fered persecution on account of her membership in a particular 
social group comprised of “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship.”150 Nevertheless, the BIA applied 
its immutability,151 particularity,152 and social distinction153 require-
ments to determine if such a particular social group existed.154
As to “immutability,” the BIA recognized that gender is an im-
mutable characteristic and the group in Ms. Cifuentes’s case 
shared gender as an immutable characteristic.155 The BIA further 
recognized that marital status, when the individual is unable to 
leave the relationship, could constitute an immutable characteris-
tic.156 But, such a determination would be dependent upon the 
facts and evidence in a particular case.157 The BIA went on to list 
some of the factors which would be relevant to this analysis, such as 
whether dissolution of the marriage is possible in light of religious, 
cultural, moral, or legal constraints; background country infor-
mation; and the applicant’s own experiences.158
In regard to “particularity,” the BIA acknowledged that the 
terms of “married,” “women” and “unable to leave the relation-
ship” have “commonly accepted definitions within Guatemalan so-
ciety.”159 The BIA found that the terms could be combined to cre-
ate a group with discrete and definable boundaries acknowledging 
that a married woman’s inability to leave a relationship may be in-
formed by societal expectations about gender, subordination, and 
legal constraints on divorce and separation.160 In particular, the 
148. Id. at 389–90.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 390.
151. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Moghar-
rabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
152. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 
(B.I.A. 2014).
153. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227; In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208.
154. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390–95.
155. Id. at 392.
156. Id. at 392–93.
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applicant sought protection from the police, but they refused to 
help her because of her marital relationship.161
In its application of the “social distinction” requirement, the BIA 
found that Guatemalan society makes meaningful distinctions 
based on the common immutable characteristics of being a mar-
ried woman in a domestic relationship that she cannot leave.162
Specifically, evidence in Ms. Cifuentes’s case demonstrated a cul-
ture of “machismo and family violence” in Guatemala.163 Guatema-
la’s laws for prosecution of domestic violence crimes were not reg-
ularly enforced because the police often failed to respond to 
domestic violence disturbances.164 Again, the BIA provided exam-
ples of evidence that could be offered in support of social distinc-
tion in a domestic violence-related asylum claim. These included: 
“whether the society in question recognizes the need to offer pro-
tection to victims of domestic violence, including whether the 
country has criminal laws designed to protect domestic abuse vic-
tims, whether those laws are effectively enforced, and other socio-
political factors.”165 An applicant can demonstrate this evidence 
through documented country conditions, law enforcement statis-
tics, expert witnesses, an applicant’s past experiences, and other 
credible sources of information.166 Accordingly, the BIA deter-
mined that its own analysis was in accord with the DHS’s conces-
sion that Ms. Cifuentes had suffered past persecution on account 
of her particular social group comprised of married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.
Although the BIA’s favorable determination of an asylum claim 
involving domestic violence in a published decision was significant, 
the BIA’s analysis and holding in Matter of A-R-C-G- was narrow.167
In Matter of A-B-, discussed below, Attorney General Sessions assert-
ed that Matter of A-R-C-G- recognized an expansive new category of 
asylum claims based on private violence. In reality, the particular 
social group category—“married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship”—was restrictive. The BIA rec-
161. Id.




166. Id. at 395.
167. Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards and 
Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2016) (asserting that the legal holding in 
the case is “narrow and fact-specific,” continuing to allow immigration judges significant dis-
cretion).
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ognized that “gender” is an immutable characteristic, but the addi-
tion of “married women” and “unable to leave their relationship”
to define the particular social group in A-R-C-G- ignored that wom-
en in general, unmarried or married, may suffer harm from male 
intimate partners or family members and a government may fail to 
protect them.168 Gender alone could have formed this particular 
social group. 
Further, the BIA’s opinion put substantial emphasis on DHS’s
concessions in the case.169 The BIA asserted repeatedly that when 
“concessions are not made and accepted as binding,” immigration 
judges would decide the issues in asylum claims, including those 
involving domestic violence, depending on the facts and circum-
stances of each case.170 In asylum claims involving a proposed par-
ticular social group, similar to that in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the rele-
vant considerations may include: (a) whether inability to leave a 
marriage constitutes an immutable characteristic, and (b) whether 
the group of married women in a domestic relationship who are 
unable to leave has discrete and definable boundaries and is social-
ly distinct.171
Although Matter of A-R-C-G recognized an asylum claim involving 
intimate partner violence, it did not ultimately resolve the primary 
interpretive barriers to gender-based asylum claims: 
(1) that persecution of women is often inflicted because of 
their gender, which is not one of the five grounds for asy-
lum; . . .
(2) that women are often persecuted by non-state actors or 
private persons, rather than by their country’s government, 
but the government is unable or unwilling to provide pro-
tection for these women from such persecution[; and]
(3) that women suffer harms which are often different 
from the harms suffered by men, they are disproportionate-
ly affected by these harms, and societies and cultures often 
condone or acquiesce to these harms.172
168. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93; see Gabriela Corrales, Justice Delayed is Justice 
Denied: The Real Significance of Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 70, 84–85 
(2016).
169. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93.
170. Id. at 393.
171. Id. at 388, 390, 393–95.
172. Musalo, supra note 3, at 781–82. These barriers continue to directly impact deter-
minations about whether a cognizable particular social group was identified, whether the 
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Unfortunately, the narrow holding of Matter of A-R-C-G allowed 
adjudicators in subsequent cases to disregard any guidance the BIA 
provided in evaluating gender-based asylum claims, in particular 
those involving intimate partner violence.173 The BIA did not pub-
lish subsequent determinations citing Matter of A-R-C-G-.174 Howev-
er, a number of U.S. circuit courts, in published and unpublished 
decisions, analyzed Matter of A-R-C-G-, as well as the interpretations 
and applications of the case by immigration judges and the BIA.
Contrary to Attorney General Sessions’s assertion in his decision 
that Matter of A-R-C-G- created confusion, the U.S. circuit courts, 
the BIA, and immigration judges predominantly distinguished 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, and few adjudicators favorably applied the case 
for the asylum applicant.175
Nevertheless, due to the Attorney General’s recent decision in 
Matter of A-B-, gender-based asylum claims, including those involv-
ing intimate partner violence, have suffered a significant blow to 
any limited progress that Matter of A-R-C-G- achieved.
II. MATTER OF A-B-: A RETURN TO THE 
“PRIVATE MATTER” PERCEPTION
On June 11, 2018, in Matter of A-B-, Attorney General Jeff Ses-
sions issued a decision overruling and vacating the BIA’s decision 
in Matter of A-R-C-G-.176 Sessions’s decision returned to a rejected 
understanding of intimate partner violence inflicted against a fe-
non-state actor’s persecution occurred on account of the applicant’s membership in that 
group, whether the applicant suffered past-persecution or has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution, and the applicant’s credibility.
173. Zambrana, supra note 93, at 264 (arguing that Matter of A-R-C-G- has done little to 
resolve the issues stemming from the fact that gender is not a protected category, such as
the inconsistencies of “piecemeal adjudication of gender-based claims”); see generally Book-
ey, supra note 167 (discussing immigration judges’ and BIA’s decisions post-A-R-C-G-).
174. Additionally, unpublished BIA determinations are not publicly available, which 
makes the BIA’s application and interpretations of Matter of A-R-C-G- difficult to track.
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 142; Bookey, supra note 142, at 109–11.
175. See, e.g., Guzman-Alvarez v. Sessions, 701 F. App’x 54, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2017); Cardo-
na v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 519, 520–21 (1st Cir. 2017); Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 
853 (8th Cir. 2017); Jeronimo v. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2017);
Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2016); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 
36 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Maldonado v. Lynch, 646 F. App’x 129, 131 (2d Cir. 2016) (deny-
ing petition for review of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen a woman’s case based on 
the intervening Matter of A-R-C-G- decision because a change in the law did not entitle her to 
a reopening and any change in the law would not resolve her failure to establish past domes-
tic violence as determined by the BIA).
176. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-
01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
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male partner as a “private” or “personal” matter resulting solely 
from the relationship of the parties. More specifically, Sessions re-
vived the flawed analysis reflecting this perception in the BIA’s va-
cated decision in Matter of R-A-.177 He ignored entirely the underly-
ing cause of intimate partner violence inflicted against female 
partners: gender and subordination, or the abuser’s view that the 
woman is subordinate to him in the relationship and the ac-
ceptance or reinforcement of that view by the society and cul-
ture.178 Sessions further completely disregarded over thirty years of 
progress in U.S. domestic violence laws and training designed to 
address the issues arising out of misconceptions and dynamics of 
intimate partner violence. 
The Attorney General justified his decision to overrule Matter of 
A-R-C-G- by asserting that the BIA’s examination of the legal ques-
tions “lacked rigor and broke with the Board’s own precedents”
and, thus, the case was wrongly decided.179 Further, he argued that 
the BIA should not have issued Matter of A-R-C-G- as a precedential 
decision because DHS conceded most of the legal requirements
necessary to qualify for asylum. DHS concessions “should not set 
precedential rules,” Sessions wrote.180
177. Id. at 339.
178. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Mem-
ber, dissenting); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.); DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10., 14–16; DHS R-A-
Brief, supra note 62, at 26–28; Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review 
of United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 58–59 (1998) (“[D]omestic violence is not about what a woman believes, but 
about her gender identity—and the sexist beliefs of the man who abuses her. This cannot be 
captured under the rubric of political opinion because . . . political opinion refers to the 
victim’s beliefs, and not those of the persecutor.”); Suzanne Sidun, An End to the Violence: 
Justifying Gender as a Particular Social Group, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 103, 138–39 (2000) (“The major-
ity of women abroad are not raped or beaten because of a political opinion that they hold. 
Women are raped and beaten because they are women.”).
179. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 333.
180. The Attorney General went even further to state that parties are not permitted to 
stipulate to legal conclusions reserved for the court. While a court may not be bound by the 
stipulations of the parties on questions of law, there is no prohibition against accepting such 
stipulations in the court’s determination.
To state that parties cannot stipulate to issues for litigation is not only contrary to the 
regulations, but entirely inefficient. In fact, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a) (2018) provides: “Pre-
hearing conferences may be scheduled at the discretion of the Immigration Judge. The con-
ference may be held to narrow issues, to obtain stipulations between the parties, to ex-
change information voluntarily, and otherwise to simplify and organize the proceeding.” 
The Immigration Court Practice Manual also provides that “the parties are strongly encour-
aged to confer prior to a hearing in order to narrow issues for litigation.” IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 142, § 4.18(a), at 90. Cases are often decided using 
the stipulations of the parties. Any agreement between the parties would be useless because
they would still need to present evidence and argument on that legal issue. Further, if a law-
yer, such as a DHS attorney, believes that the law and facts support acknowledging that an 
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The Attorney General further claimed that the Matter of A-R-C-G-
opinion “caused confusion because it recognized an expansive new 
category of particular social groups based on private violence.”181
He cited no decisions to support this “confusion” or the recogni-
tion of “an expansive new category of particular social groups.” In 
addition, Sessions explained that the BIA’s decision in Matter of 
A-B- and two other opinions treated A-R-C-G- as establishing a new 
category of cognizable, particular social groups, specifically en-
compassing Central American domestic violence victims.182 While 
adjudicators have not recognized a social group comprised of 
“Central American domestic violence victims,” adjudicators, DHS, 
and the international community have affirmed that women who 
have suffered domestic violence in their countries may be able to 
assert a viable claim for asylum.183
Sessions further explained that several U.S. circuit courts have 
expressed “skepticism” about Matter of A-R-C-G-. However, Sessions 
misinterpreted the U.S. circuit courts’ analyses distinguishing 
A-R-C-G-; the various opinions did not demonstrate the courts’
“skepticism” but, rather, showed the narrow holding of A-R-C-G-.
For example, A-R-C-G- is often distinguished because DHS conced-
ed the cognizability of the particular social group and the persecu-
tion on account of that particular social group in the case.184 These 
appellate court cases actually supported the view that A-R-C-G- did 
asylum applicant has proven a particular issue in her case, it may contravene the rules of 
professional conduct for that lawyer to continue to assert that issue. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). There is no requirement that the 
BIA “write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that it consider the 
issues raised and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to 
perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 
105, 107 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 
1987)).
181. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
182. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 332; (citing In re D-M-R- (B.I.A. June 9, 2015); In re E-M-
(B.I.A. Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/document/271353122/E-M-BIA-Feb-18-
2015 (certain docket information redacted)).
183. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, 
dissenting); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken 
from Eng.); UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra
note 62, at 13 n.10, 14–16; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 26–28; Bookey, supra note 142;
Coven Memorandum, supra note 69.
184. See, e.g., Menjivar-Sibrian v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-12207, 2018 WL 1415126, at *1 (11th 
Cir. Mar. 22, 2018); Solorzano-De Maldonado v. Sessions, No. 16-60153, 2018 WL 1192988, 
at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018); Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2018);
Guzman-Alvarez v. Sessions, No. 16-904, 701 F. App’x 54, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2017); Velasquez v. 
Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2017); Cardona v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 519, 520–21 (1st 
Cir. 2017); Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 849 (8th Cir. 2017); Jeronimo v. Att’y
Gen., 678 F. App’x 796, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2017); Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 36 (1st 
Cir. 2016); Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 2016).
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not establish “an expansive new category of particular social 
groups,” whether based on “private violence,” “Central American 
domestic violence victims,” “Guatemalan women in domestic rela-
tionships who are unable to leave,” or any other particular social 
group. In contradiction to Sessions’s view, the U.S. court of appeals 
cases demonstrated that adjudicators continued to analyze asylum 
claims on a case-by-case basis.185
Matter of A-R-C-G- provided no change in the standards govern-
ing asylum or “rule of general applicability.”186 In Matter of A-B-,
Sessions cited no case in which adjudicators questioned or even 
challenged the determination in Matter of A-R-C-G-. His determina-
tion to overrule the case is in stark contrast to his reliance on the 
BIA’s determinations that have been vacated by an attorney gen-
eral (Matter of R-A-) or questioned by U.S. circuit courts (Matters of 
M-E-V-G- and W-R-G-). 
Despite Sessions’s generalized statements on the viability of hy-
pothetical asylum claims, these claims must be adjudicated based 
on the facts and circumstances of each case, as opposed to a com-
plete rejection of such claims.187 As such, Sessions’s decision does 
not preclude asylum claims involving intimate partner violence.188
Nevertheless, the Attorney General’s reliance on hypothetical 
characterizations of particular social groups in the Matter of A-B-
decision creates more confusion in the adjudication of gender-
based asylum claims, in particular those involving intimate partner 
violence. 
Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s assertions to the contra-
ry, his decision provides no clarity on the adjudication of asylum 
claims involving “a victim of private criminal activity” or any asylum 
185. See cases cited in notes 175, 185.
186. The BIA noted that “in cases where concessions are not made and accepted as bind-
ing, these issues will be decided based on the particular facts and evidence on a case-by-case 
basis as addressed by the Immigration Judge in the first instance.” In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). Further-
more, “[i]n particular, the issue of nexus will depend on the facts and circumstances of an 
individual claim.” Id.
187. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987);
CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, MATTER OF A-B-: CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY 6, 13 
(2018) [hereinafter CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform); NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING 
FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 14 (2018), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/
default/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-
%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf [hereinafter NIJC PRACTICE 
ADVISORY].
188. NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187.
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claim involving persecution by a non-state actor. In fact, Sessions’s
decision raises issues arising out of three key elements of the refu-
gee definition: (1) membership in a particular social group; (2) 
nexus; and (3) past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.189 The ambiguities in Sessions’ decision will also nega-
tively impact credibility determinations in gender-based asylum 
claims.
Moreover, the policies established by the Attorney General in 
the Matter of A-B- decision are likely to be contested in the future.190
Additional challenges are further likely to be made based on the 
Attorney General’s lack of authority to issue this decision and a vio-
lation of Ms. A-B-’s due process rights.191
189. On July 11, 2018, shortly after the Matter of A-B- decision, the USCIS issued a Policy 
Memorandum titled, “Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and 
Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-.” (DHS Policy Memorandum). The DHS 
Policy Memorandum is intended to provide guidance to USCIS officers in determining who 
is eligible for asylum and refugee status based on Matter of A-B- and applies to asylum and 
refugee officers processing reasonable fear, credible fear, asylum, and refugee claims. Since 
this policy memo primarily follows the policies established in Matter of A-B-, it also raises is-
sues regarding the three key elements of the refugee definition. Additionally, as discussed in 
further detail below, at least one court has recently found that aspects of this memo go be-
yond the policies set forth in Matter of A-B- decision and incorrectly interpret and apply the 
decision. See Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
190. See e.g., Grace, 2018 WL 6628081, at *36.
191. In addition to the issues raised in the Attorney General’s opinion related to the ref-
ugee definition, the decision disregards procedural regulations and violates due process. 
This may call into question the precedential value and even the validity of the decision. See 
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 4 n.7. Ms. A-B-’s brief, as well as a brief from 
sixteen former immigration judges and members of the BIA, informed the Attorney General 
that the BIA could not refer Matter of A-B- because the case was not under the jurisdiction of 
the BIA in the absence of an order from the immigration judge. Rather, they urged the At-
torney General to remand the case to the BIA to respond to the immigration judge’s order. 
See Brief for Respondent, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://
uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291241595459 [herein-
after Brief for Respondent A-B-] (certain docket information redacted); Brief of Sixteen 
Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) [hereinafter “IJ 
and BIA Amicus Brief”], https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz
4rname4bk29s7/file/291245779320.
Although the Attorney General acknowledged that the immigration judge’s certifica-
tion order was procedurally defective, he rejected this request. Sessions argued that there is 
nothing in the federal regulation that prevents him from referring a case for review “simply 
because the Board has remanded the case for further processing before an immigration 
judge,” and his authority to review was not restricted to “final” decisions of the BIA. In re 
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 324. However, Attorney General Sessions ignored the issue that the 
BIA must refer the decision to the attorney general upon his direction, and if the BIA does 
not have jurisdiction over the decision, it lacks the power to refer the case to the Attorney 
General. See Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra, at 18–20 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) 
(2018), which requires the Board to “refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision 
all cases that [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.”); North Carolina 
Growers’ Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d 755, 764 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e must be strict in reviewing 
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Indeed, in the recent decision, Grace v. Whitaker, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia addressed challenges to the pol-
icies established in Matter of A-B- and the DHS Policy Memoran-
dum.192 The plaintiffs—twelve adults and children from Central 
American countries—gave accounts of domestic and gang violence 
in their countries, including sexual abuse, kidnappings, and beat-
ings. The plaintiffs were placed in the expedited removal process, 
and asylum officers conducted credible fear interviews. The asylum 
officers found their stories to be credible but issued negative cred-
ible fear determinations for each plaintiff, applying the policies set 
forth in Matter of A-B- and the DHS Policy Memorandum. Upon re-
view, an immigration judge affirmed the asylum officers’ findings. 
Final orders of removal were entered against the plaintiffs, and 
they sought the district court’s review of the expedited removal or-
ders issued because of the negative credible fear determinations. 
The court, exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(e)(3)(A)(ii), found certain policies for expedited review of 
credible fear determinations contained in Matter of A-B- and the 
DHS Policy Memorandum to be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary 
to the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).193 First, it 
rejected the general rule against finding credible fear in cases 
based on domestic violence victims’ and gang-related victims’
membership in a particular social group.194 Second, it rejected the 
heightened standard of “condoned” or “complete helplessness” to 
establish non-state actor persecution instead of the “unable or un-
willing” standard.195 Third, it rejected the DHS Policy Memoran-
dum’s circularity standard, prohibiting recognition of domestic-
violence-based social groups, which include the characteristic of 
“inability to leave.”196 Fourth, it rejected the delineation require-
ment in a credible fear interview established in the DHS Policy 
Memorandum.197 Finally, it rejected the DHS Policy Memoran-
dum’s requirement that adjudicators disregard any U.S. circuit 
court law that is inconsistent with Matter of A-B- and apply only the 
law of the U.S. circuit court in which the credible fear interview is 
an agency’s compliance with procedural rules.”); see also IJ and BIA Amicus Brief, supra, at 
10.
192. Grace, 2018 WL 6628081, at *36.
193. Id. at *13–14, *19–21, *27.
194. Id. at *20.
195. Id. at *21–23.
196. Id. at *24–25.
197. Id. at *26–27.
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held.198 The court further entered a permanent injunction prevent-
ing the government from applying these policies to credible fear 
determinations, vacated plaintiffs’ credible fear determinations 
and removal orders, and ordered the government to return the 
removed plaintiffs to the United States and provide new credible 
fear proceedings, applying the correct legal standards, for all plain-
tiffs.199
Although Grace v. Whitaker is limited to the application of these 
policies in the context of credible fear determinations prior to an 
asylum adjudication, similar challenges may be successful in the 
context of affirmative and defensive asylum adjudications. In other 
words, Grace v. Whitaker dealt the first blow to Attorney General 
Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B-, but the decision is in the ap-
peal process. Therefore, Matter of A-B- still requires critical exami-
nation.
A. The Facts of Matter of A-B-
In his decision, the Attorney General referenced the facts assert-
ed by Ms. A-B- in one sentence: “The respondent asserted that her 
ex-husband, with whom she shares three children, repeatedly 
abused her physically, emotionally, and sexually during and after 
their marriage.”200 The Attorney General made no mention of 
hundreds of pages of evidence of Ms. A-B-’s abuse and the lack of 
protection from the government.201
Ms. A-B-, a citizen of El Salvador, applied for asylum to escape a 
man—her husband and father of her three children—who had 
abused her for the past fifteen years.202 He beat and raped her on a 
constant basis. He threatened to kill her with a loaded gun and a
knife. In one instance, while she was pregnant, he threatened to 
hang her. He forced her to serve him as a slave. In order to ensure 
her fidelity to him, he would order her to show him her genitals so 
he could examine whether she had been with another man. 
Ms. A-B- attempted to obtain protection from the police. Nota-
bly, her husband’s brother was a police officer. Although she se-
cured two restraining orders against her husband, the police made 
198. Id. at *27–31.
199. Id. at *36.
200. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 at 321.
201. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 8.
202. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 2–3.
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no effort to enforce them. In fact, the police required her to serve 
the restraining orders on her husband herself, exposing her to se-
vere risk of physical harm and death. The abuse continued. Ms. 
A-B-’s husband came after her with a knife and, when she sought 
protection from the police, they refused to help, informing her in-
stead that she should leave the town. She moved to a town two 
hours away from her husband. The abuse continued once her hus-
band found her. Despite constant threats to her life from her hus-
band, Ms. A-B- secured a divorce. Even after the divorce, her ex-
husband and his brother, the police officer, confronted her and 
threatened her life. Shortly before she fled to the United States, 
her husband found her again and beat her.203
Regardless, the Attorney General vacated the BIA’s decision in 
Matter of A-B- and remanded the case to the immigration judge for 
further proceedings consistent with his determination.204 The next 
sections analyze the Attorney General’s decision and its impact re-
garding three key elements of the refugee definition: membership 
in a particular social group, nexus, and past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution in conjunction with the appli-
cant’s credibility. 
B. Particular Social Group
The Attorney General’s opinion sought to address the question 
of whether “a victim of private criminal activity constitutes persecu-
tion on account of membership in a particular social group.”205
Neither Matter of A-R-C-G- nor Matter of A-B- identified a social 
group comprised of “victims of private criminal activity,” “victims of 
domestic violence,” or “victims of intimate partner violence.”206
Nevertheless, the Attorney General analyzed whether these con-
ceptions of social groups met the definition of a particular social 
group. 
Despite the Attorney General’s unsubstantiated statement that, 
in general, asylum claims based on domestic violence perpetrated 
203. Id. at 6.
204. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
205. Id. at 325.
206. Brief of Sixteen Former Immigration Judges and Members of the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 15, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 
(A.G. 2018), https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/
291245779320.; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936) (courts 
cannot issue “an advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts”).
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by non-state actors will not qualify for asylum, he did not state that 
domestic violence may never serve as a basis for an asylum claim.207
Any such statement would have been contrary to BIA precedent 
including Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of Acosta, which provide that 
whether an applicant has established her membership in a particu-
lar social group is a determination made on a case-by-case basis.208
Rather, Sessions took issue with Matter of A-R-C-G- because of the 
BIA’s lack of deep analysis due to DHS’s concessions. In particular, 
Sessions faulted the BIA’s failure to explain how the evidence pre-
sented in the case met the three elements that define a particular 
social group—immutability, particularity, and social distinction.209
207. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 320. Since Matter of A-B-, U.S. circuit courts have recognized 
both that the overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G- does not necessarily prevent the recognition of 
a particular social group based on nationality, gender, relationship status, and inability to 
leave as cognizable, and that the overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G- in general means such 
groups are not cognizable. See e.g., Padilla-Maldonado v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-3097, 2018 WL 
4896385, at *5 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2018) (finding the overruling of Matter of A-R-C-G- in Matter of 
A-B- does not automatically defeat applicant’s claim that she is a member of a cognizable 
particular social group); Najera v. Whitaker, 745 Fed. App’x 670, 671 (8th Cir. 2018) (find-
ing that under Matter of A-B-, the group identified as “Salvadorean females unable to leave a 
domestic relationship” may not be cognizable); Martinez-Martinez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 
629, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Matter of A-B- and finding that although the facts “sup-
ported” that applicant was able to safely leave her husband and live in another village in this 
case, “[w]e would not agree that every woman who is able to escape her husband thereby 
removes herself from the social group of women who are unable to leave their relationship, 
or thereby severs the nexus between her group and the persecution she suffers.”); Ticas-
Guillen v. Whitaker, 744 F. App’x 410, 411 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that remand to the BIA 
is required to consider whether the proposed social group is cognizable in light of Matter of 
A-B-, but stating that the immigration judge’s denial finding the proposed social group was 
“‘just too broad’ . . . cannot stand” and recognizing that gender and nationality can form a 
particular social group under the law).
In Grace v. Whitaker, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found 
that Matter of A-B- and the DHS Policy Memorandum established a general rule against find-
ing credible fear in cases based on domestic violence and gang-related claims. No. 18-cv-
01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). Interestingly, the government argued that there was no such gen-
eral rule established by Matter of A-B- and the Matter of A-B- decision only prohibited a party’s
concession to satisfy an element of an asylum claim while the remaining statements were 
mere commentary. Id. at *19. Nevertheless, the court in Grace found that a general rule was 
articulated and this general rule “effectively bar[ring] the claims based on certain categories 
of persecutors” constituted an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the term “particular 
social group” because it is inconsistent with Congress’s intent to bring U.S. law into con-
formance with the 1967 Protocol and the requirement of case-by-case adjudication of credi-
ble fear determinations. Id. at *20.
208. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
209. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 318–20.
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1. The BIA’s Definition of a 
Particular Social Group Remains Unchanged
The Attorney General recognized the BIA’s immutable charac-
teristic definition of membership in a particular social group set 
forth in Matter of Acosta. However, he relied on the BIA’s articula-
tion of the three elements for establishing membership in a par-
ticular social group in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-:
membership in a group, (1) whose members share a common im-
mutable characteristic, (2) that is defined with particularity and 
(3) that is socially distinct within the society in question.210 This 
definition includes Matter of Acosta’s immutable characteristic re-
quirement as an element, but adds the two additional elements of 
particularity and social distinction. The Attorney General made no 
change in the requirements set forth in these cases but asserted 
that because “particular social group” is ambiguous, the Attorney 
General and the BIA have “primary responsibility for construing”
this provision.211
The Attorney General and the BIA, however, do not have unre-
stricted power to construe the definition of “particular social 
group.” In fact, the U.S. circuit courts must determine if an agen-
cy’s interpretation of an “ambiguous” statutory provision is a “per-
missible construction of the statute.”212 The BIA cannot adjudicate 
asylum claims based on a particular social group “inconsistently” or 
“irrationally.”213 Although the BIA may add new requirements to its 
definition of a particular social group, it must provide a “princi-
pled reason” for its departure from its precedent in Matter of 
Acosta.214
210. Id. at 330–31.
211. Id. at 326–27.
212. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603, 612 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Chevron, USA, Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). In Grace v. 
Whitaker, the court found that although the term “particular social group” was ambiguous, 
Matter of A-B-’s and the DHS Policy Memorandum’s interpretation of this term was not a 
permissible construction of the statute and was arbitrary and capricious. Grace, 2018 WL 
6628081, at *20.
213. Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (“Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation 
of ‘particular social group’ Chevron deference in Fatin, this did not give the agency license to 
thereafter adjudicate claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally. Agencies 
are not free, under Chevron, to generate erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of their gov-
erning statutes . . . . Consistency over time and across subjects is a relevant factor [un-
der Chevron] when deciding whether the agency’s current interpretation is ‘reasonable.’”) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 608. The court in Grace v. Whitaker further provided extensive discussion re-
jecting the DHS Policy Memorandum’s instruction to asylum officers to ignore inconsistent 
U.S. circuit court decisions. The court explained that an agency’s interpretation of a provi-
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Nevertheless, the Attorney General made no mention of the de-
cisions in the Seventh Circuit215 on whether the requirements es-
tablished by the BIA in these cases of “particularity” and “social dis-
tinction” is a permissible construction of “particular social group.”
These requirements are repetitive and confusing.216 As described 
below, the definition of a particular social group should more 
closely follow Acosta and UNHCR guidelines, which are in accord-
ance with the principle of ejusdem generis.217
2. The Particular Social Groups Exist Independently 
from the Harm
Attorney General Sessions wrote in his A-B- decision that had the 
BIA applied the M-E-V-G- social group requirements with the ap-
propriate analysis, the social group would not have been cogniza-
ble. Sessions determined that a particular social group “must ‘exist 
independently’ of the harm asserted” in the asylum claim.218 The 
risk of being persecuted cannot be the characteristic shared by the 
sion may only replace a prior court interpretation if the interpretation is entitled to Chevron
deference and the agency interpretation is reasonable. Grace, 2018 WL 6628081, at *28 (cit-
ing Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’s Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). If 
an interpretation is not afforded deference, the agency is bound by the court’s interpreta-
tion even if the agency’s interpretation is contrary to that of the court. Id. at *29.
215. The Seventh Circuit has refused to apply the requirements of “particularity” and 
“social visibility/distinction.” See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2013); Gat-
imi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
216. See also S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 553 (3d Cir. 2018) (acknowledging that
the requirements of “social distinction” and “particularity” overlap); Cece, 733 F.3d at 674, 
677 (finding the “breadth of the social group says nothing about the requirements 
for asylum”); Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615 (noting the “social visibility” criterion “makes no 
sense”); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (noting that there is some de-
gree of overlap between the particularity and social distinction requirements because both 
take societal context into account), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I & N. Dec. 227, 241 (B.I.A. 2014) (recog-
nizing they “overlap because the overall definition is applied in the fact-specific context of 
an applicant’s claim for relief”); Zambrana, supra note 93.
217. See Castillo Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Acosta strikes 
an acceptable balance between (1) rendering ‘particular social group’ a catch-all for all 
groups who might claim persecution, which would render the other four categories mean-
ingless, and (2) rendering ‘particular social group’ a nullity by making its requirements too 
stringent or too specific.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in 
part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Paraketsova, supra note 92; Zam-
brana, supra note 93.
218. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334–35 (A.G. 2018) (citing In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 227, 236 n.11, 243 (B.I.A. 2014)), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 
(EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018); see also Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881 
F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2018); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003); In re W-G-
R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215 (B.I.A. 2014).
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group.219 He stated that the particular social group identified in A-
R-C-G-, “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave 
their relationship,” failed because such a group is “effectively de-
fined” as “women in Guatemala who are victims of domestic 
abuse.”220 Specifically, the group was defined by the risk of persecu-
tion as a woman’s inability to leave was created by the harm or 
threatened harm.221
Contrary to the Attorney General’s categorization, the “inability 
to leave” does not constitute “persecution.” The subjugation of 
women in society or culture creates the situation in which a woman 
may be unable to leave a relationship.222 The BIA in Matter of 
A-R-C-G- specifically recognized that “a married woman’s inability 
to leave the relationship may be informed by societal expectations 
about gender and subordination, as well as legal constraints re-
garding divorce and separation,” and cited to numerous U.S. gov-
ernment sources supporting this conclusion.223 The Attorney Gen-
eral ignored this explanation provided by the BIA. Rather, he 
dismissed A-R-C-G-, finding that it failed to consider whether the 
group identified “was effectively defined” as women in Guatemala 
who are victims of domestic abuse because their inability to leave 
was created by the harm. The BIA had no reason to consider this 
question because it found that inability to leave might result from 
societal expectations about gender and subordination. 
Regardless, the definition of a particular social group does not 
require “complete independence” from the characteristic of the 
persecution suffered.224 Although members of a group may all 
219. See Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
220. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335.
221. Id.
222. Brief of Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 31–32; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, 
supra note 62, at 14–15; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62; Nanasi, supra note 137, at 746–51.
223. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393–95 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing In re W-G-R-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. at 214) (observing that, in evaluating a group’s particularity, it may be necessary to 
take into account the social and cultural context of the alien’s country of citizenship or na-
tionality), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 111TH 
CONG., Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 2598 (Joint Comm. Print 
2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT62931/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT62931.
pdf; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Guatemala – 2008 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2008/wha/119161.htm.
224. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2013); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra 
note 187, at 12 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007); In re W-G-R-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 215 (B.I.A. 2014); Cece, 733 F.3d at 671)); NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, su-
pra note 187, at 13, 17 (citing Cece, 733 F.3d at 671; Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d 
Cir. 2003)). The court in Grace v. Whitaker found that the DHS Policy Memorandum went 
“well beyond the Attorney General’s explanation” of circularity in Matter of A-B-. No. 18-cv-
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share the characteristic of suffering persecution, this does not pre-
vent the recognition of a particular social group. This is because 
other components of the group’s characteristics may establish the 
existence of a particular social group.225 If only particular social 
groups that have complete independence from the persecution 
suffered could be considered cognizable, many previously granted 
asylum claims would no longer meet the requirements of a cog-
nizable social group.226 For instance, in Matter of Kasinga, women 
who fear or have experienced female genital mutilation comprised 
the social group of “[y]oung women who are members of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been 
subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, 
and who oppose the practice.”227 Moreover, in Matter of M-E-V-G-,
the BIA specifically recognized that Matter of Kasinga, which in-
volved an applicant who was opposed to the practice of FGM, illus-
trated that a group may be socially distinct without ocular visibility. 
The BIA explained that a society could still perceive such women 
to comprise a particular social group for many reasons including,
the sociopolitical or cultural conditions of the country.228
As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Cece v. Holder, “it is not 
fair to conclude that the group is defined by the harm or potential 
harm inflicted merely by the language used rather than determin-
ing what underlying characteristics account for the fear and vul-
01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *25 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). The court found that the DHS Policy Memorandum’s statement 
that “a particular social group defined solely by the ability to leave a relationship” would not 
be “sufficiently particular” to be to be an incorrect interpretation of the circularity standard 
and analysis of Matter of A-B-. It also found that it was an incorrect interpretation of the cir-
cularity standard and analysis of Matter of A-B- to argue that, “even if ‘unable to leave’ were 
particular, the applicant must show something more than the danger of harm from an 
abuser if the applicant tried to leave because that would amount to circularly defining the 
particular social group by the harm on which the asylum claim is based.” Id. The court ex-
plained that such a “general circularity rule foreclosing such claims” is arbitrary, capricious 
and contrary to immigration law as it fails to consider the facts presented in each case. Id.
Moreover, it changes settled law, which recognizes that if a group contains characteristics 
independent of the persecution, it may be recognized as a particular social group, but fails 
to provide a reasoned explanation for the change. Id.
225. Cece, 733 F.3d at 671.
226. Id. (citing Agbor v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 2007); Sarhan v. Holder, 
658 F.3d 649, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2011)) (noting other recognized particular social groups that 
included the shared trait of suffering persecution) (explanatory parentheticals omitted); 
Reply Brief for Respondent at 15, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://
uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291288954047 [herein-
after Reply Brief for Respondent A-B-] (arguing that if a particular social group that is de-
fined in part by the harm feared is never cognizable, “it would throw into doubt the availa-
bility of asylum to applicants who suffered or fear female genital mutilation.”).
227. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
228. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240–41 (B.I.A. 2014).
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nerability.”229 Attorney General Sessions failed to consider the “un-
derlying characteristics” that cause the group’s fear and vulnerabil-
ity. The group holds the common, immutable characteristics of be-
ing “married,” “women,” “in Guatemala,” “unable to leave their 
relationship.”230 This group’s fear and vulnerability stems from the 
subordination of women in Guatemala and the view of married 
women as “property.”231 Further, even assuming the Attorney Gen-
eral was correct that the inability to leave a relationship is a situa-
tion created by the harm or threat of harm, he cannot “tease out 
one component of a group’s characteristics to defeat the definition 
of a social group.”232
A particular social group defined by nationality, gender, rela-
tionship status, and the inability to leave is not new and is a con-
ception that has been offered and accepted as cognizable by DHS 
itself.233 In Matter of L-R-, DHS asserted that “the particular social 
group in asylum and withholding of removal claims based on do-
mestic violence is best defined in light of the evidence about how 
the respondent’s abuser and her society perceive her role within 
the domestic relationship.”234 DHS further proposed potential ar-
ticulations of a particular social group in an asylum case based on 
intimate partner violence, which may meet the requirements for a 
particular social group if adequately established in the record. 
These include: “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are 
unable to leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as property by 
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”235
229. Cece, 733 F.3d at 672.
230. Id. at 673 (“Neither their age, gender, nationality, or living situation are altera-
ble.”).
231. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[A] married woman’s in-
ability to leave the relationship may be informed by societal expectations about gender 
and subordination, as well as legal constraints regarding divorce and separation.”), overruled 
by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 
14 (recognizing that a group articulated as “Mexican women who are viewed as property by 
virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship” may meet the requirements for a 
particular social group.); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 37–38 (asserting that 
“Salvadoran women who are treated as property by virtue of their positions in their domestic 
relationships” constitutes a particular social group); see also In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 
929 (A.G. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 
62.
232. Cece, 733 F.3d at 673 (citing Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2011)).
233. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 7 n.21 (noting that since 2004, DHS 
has recognized that gender, nationality, and relationship status may form a particular social 
group); see DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10, 14; DHS R-A- Brief, supra 
note 62.
234. DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 14.
235. Id.
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In regard to “social visibility/distinction,” DHS recognized that 
social distinction might be demonstrated if evidence reflects a so-
cietal view that “the status of a woman in a domestic relationship 
places the woman into a segment of society that will not be accord-
ed protection from harm inflicted by a domestic partner.”236 Fur-
ther, such a social group may be sufficiently “particular” based on 
how a domestic relationship is defined within the society, such as 
through laws criminalizing domestic violence.237
Moreover, the facts of A-R-C-G- and A-B- both support cognizable 
social groups applying the three-element analysis.
a. Immutability
The Attorney General’s only argument regarding immutability 
appeared to be that a particular social group cannot be defined by 
the persecution of its members. As discussed above, the group 
“women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” is not 
defined by the persecution of its members. Moreover, gender, na-
tionality, relationship status, perception as property, and living sit-
uation are immutable characteristics.238
236. Id. at 18.
237. Id. at 18–19.
238. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing gender, na-
tionality, and youth as immutable characteristics); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 
(9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that women in a particular country can constitute a particu-
lar social group, regardless of ethnicity or clan membership); Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 
1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that widowed Cameroonian women constitute a particu-
lar social group); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Iranian wom-
en who refuse to conform to their government’s gender-specific laws and social norms may 
satisfy the Acosta standard); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929 (B.I.A. 2000) (Guendels-
berger, Board Member, dissenting); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(treating gender and tribal identity as immutable characteristics); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (establishing that “membership in a particular social group” re-
fers to common immutable characteristics), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) 
(appeal taken from Eng.); see also UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, ¶ 30. DHS 
Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 14 (recognizing that a group articulated as “Mexi-
can women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic rela-
tionship” may meet the requirements for a particular social group); Brief for Respondent A-
B-, supra note 190, at 37–38 (asserting that “Salvadoran women who are treated as property 
by virtue of their positions in their domestic relationships” constitutes a particular social 
group); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62.
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b. Particularity
The Attorney General asserted that the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G-
failed to consider whether the terms “married,” “women,” and 
“unable to leave the relationship” considered together constitute a 
discrete social group. Principally, he claimed that the BIA did not 
provide an analysis to show that the proposed group was “defined 
by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining 
who falls within the group.”239 He then made the conclusory asser-
tion that “[s]ocial groups defined by their vulnerability to private 
criminal activity likely lack the particularity required under M-E-V-
G-, given that broad swaths of society may be susceptible to victimi-
zation.”240 In dicta, he cited the example of those who are victims of 
gang violence.241
Women who suffer persecution in the form of intimate partner 
violence are not victims of “private criminal activity” any more than 
women who are subjected to or refuse to be subjected to FGM.242
The Attorney General missed the underlying reasons for this 
group’s vulnerability: the subordinate position of women in the so-
ciety, the subordinate position of women in domestic relationships 
in the society, the treatment of women in domestic relationships as 
beneath government protection. Persecution by a private person, 
or non-state actor, still may constitute persecution if the govern-
ment is unwilling or unable to provide protection to the targeted 
group.243
As explained in Matters of M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, “the terms used 
to describe the group” must have “commonly accepted definitions 
in the society of which the group is a part.”244 Evidence that sup-
ports legal definitions of the terms used to describe the social 
group, such as “domestic relationship,” “married,” “women,” “una-
ble to leave the relationship,” and “children in common,” would 
presumably also support the argument that they have “commonly 




242. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 246; In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365–66.
243. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 22 (“If the Attorney General is asking 
whether criminal acts committed by private (non-State) actors may constitute persecution, a 
contrary ruling would fly in the face of decades of precedent, the plain language of the stat-
ute, and the clear intent of Congress.”).
244. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239; In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 
2014).
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accepted definitions in the society.”245 Further, the social and cul-
tural context of the applicant’s country may be taken into account 
in evaluating a group’s particularity. The inability of a married 
woman or a woman in a domestic/intimate partner relationship to 
leave may be defined by “societal expectations about gender and 
subordination,” legal constraints on divorce and separation, child 
custody, and a lack of protections for women and their children 
who want to leave a relationship.246
Even if there are legal protections, police often refuse to assist 
women experiencing intimate partner violence because of societal 
expectations about gender, subordination, and interference with 
marital relationships.247 This evidences that a group defined by na-
tionality, gender, relationship status, and inability to leave the rela-
tionship is accepted by the society as a clearly defined group, which 
is subordinate to men and outside of the government’s protec-
tion.248 There is nothing amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjec-
tive about these groups. The Attorney General provided no rea-
sonable explanation why such groups are amorphous, overbroad, 
diffuse, or subjective. 
c. Social Distinction
Attorney General Sessions asserted that these social group con-
structs “will often lack sufficient social distinction to be cognizable 
as a distinct social group.”249 In support of his conclusion, Sessions 
cited the BIA’s vacated decision in Matter of 
R-A- as holding that the applicant failed to show that her social 
group was a segment of the population that was recognized by the 
245. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–93 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); see Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 37–38.
246. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93. Matter of A-B- involved social groups identi-
fied as “El Salvadoran women in domestic relationships they are unable to leave,” “El Salva-
doran women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children 
in common,” or “Salvadoran women.” In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320, 343 (A.G. 2018), 
abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 
2018); see Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 32, 37–38.
247. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93; see Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 
190, at 37–38, see DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 17.
248. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93. In regard to particularity, the BIA re-
quires that a particular social group “be defined by characteristics that provide a clear 
benchmark for determining who falls within the group.” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 
239.
249. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.
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society.250 The Attorney General’s reliance on a case that was vacat-
ed by a previous Attorney General is problematic. Although Matter 
of R-A- may represent the BIA’s position in one instance, a previous 
Attorney General determined that the position was erroneous and 
vacated it. In fact, in the final remand of the case, the immigration 
judge actually granted asylum.251 Moreover, the BIA’s analysis is 
contrary to DHS’s later position taken in the same case that she did 
qualify for asylum. DHS took similar positions in subsequent cases,
and the issue became the impetus for drafting new proposed regu-
lations addressing gender-based asylum.252
Sessions further stated, “there is significant room for doubt” that 
a society would view these women as a distinct group as opposed to 
a victim of private abuse.253 He claimed that the BIA in Matter of 
A-R-C-G- failed to explain why the evidence established that Gua-
temalan society perceives “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship” as a group distinct in the socie-
ty.254 The Attorney General argued that evidence demonstrating 
social distinction must include that the society “perceives, consid-
ers or recognizes [persons sharing the particular characteristic] to 
be a distinct group.”255 He ignored that the BIA in M-E-V-G- recog-
nized that it may not be possible to identify women who are op-
posed to FGM, but a society could still perceive them as a group 
based on “sociopolitical or cultural conditions in the country.”256
Likewise, the sociopolitical and cultural conditions in a country 
may demonstrate the society’s perception of women who are in 
domestic relationships and unable to leave as a group. The society 
perceives the status of the woman in the relationship as subordi-
nate to that of the man even if she attempts to physically separate 
from him. As such, societal expectations are that abuse against the 
250. Id. The Attorney General asserted that the BIA’s decision was “thorough” and “well-
reasoned” and that “the Board and federal courts have continued to treat [the BIA’s analysis 
in Matter of R-A-] as persuasive.” Id. at 319, 328.
251. Nanasi, supra note 137, at 746–51 (describing the series of events leading DHS to 
reverse its position in Matter of R-A-).
252. Id.; see DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10, 14; DHS R-A- Brief, 
supra note 62.
253. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citing In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014)). This does not mean 
ocular visibility. To the extent the Attorney General applied the social distinction require-
ment set forth in Matter of M-E-V-G- in such a manner, it was contrary to the BIA’s articula-
tion of this requirement. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240–41 (B.I.A. 2014).
256. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238–40.
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group is tolerated.257 The fear and vulnerability of this group stems 
from the subordination of women in the country and the view of 
married women as “property.”
As further recognized by the BIA in M-E-V-G-, evidence support-
ing the prevalence of FGM in the society and the expectation that 
women of the tribe would undergo FGM demonstrated the social 
distinction of the group.258 Similarly, evidence supporting the prev-
alence of intimate partner violence in the society and the ac-
ceptance of the abuse of women in the society demonstrates the 
social distinction of the group. Women understand that they are a 
part of this group, as they know the government or police will not 
provide protection. The BIA in M-E-V-G- further provided an in-
structive list of evidence that may establish that a group is per-
ceived by society as distinct including “country conditions reports,
expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws 
and policies, historical animosities, and the like.”259 Such evidence 
was presented in Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, including 
country conditions reports from U.S. congressional committees 
and the U.S. State Department and press accounts of the culture of 
family violence and machismo. Further, experts provided testimony 
on the prevalence of domestic violence, sexual offenses against 
women, and the failure of police to enforce laws against domestic 
violence in the women’s respective countries.260
Unsurprisingly, the Attorney General ignored both the re-
spondent’s articulation of the particular social group in Matter of 
A-B- as “Salvadoran women” and the respondent’s argument that 
gender alone may establish a particular social group. The BIA and 
U.S. circuit courts have recognized particular social groups com-
prised of women, including the BIA’s recognition of “sex” in Matter 
of Acosta261 as an immutable characteristic forming a social group. 
U.S. circuit courts have recognized Iranian women, Somali women, 
female members of a tribe, and widows in Cameroon as particular 
257. For an illustration of DHS’s prior position on social visibility/distinction, see DHS
Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 8, 14.
258. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 246.
259. Id. at 244.
260. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 331–32; In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A.
2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); see Brief for Respondent A-B-,
supra note 190, at 36–37.
261. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that the shared 
characteristic of sex may form a particular social group and persecution may be directed 
toward an individual who is a member of such a particular social group), overruled in part by
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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social groups.262 Jeff Sessions took extraordinary measures to ana-
lyze the applicant’s membership in a particular social group utiliz-
ing the narrowest interpretations possible.263
C. Nexus
The Attorney General asserted that DHS’s concession in Matter 
of A-R-C-G- that the applicant was persecuted on account of her 
particular social group comprised of “married women in Guatema-
la who are unable to leave their relationship” was contrary to the 
facts of the case and other cases. In support of this conclusion, he 
relied on the analysis in a vacated BIA decision, Matter of R-A-, and 
ignored actual precedent on the issue. Relying on Matter of R-A-, he 
argued that the abuser in Matter of A-R-C-G- attacked the applicant 
because of a “preexisting personal relationship” and not because 
“he was aware of, and hostile to,” her particular social group. Ses-
sions cited the BIA’s explanation in Matter of R-A- that evidence did 
not demonstrate that the applicant’s husband had animosity to-
wards the group as a whole or that the persecutor was aware of the 
existence of the group.264
First, the Attorney General attempted to return the understand-
ing of intimate partner violence against women to one based on a 
motive that is personal to the relationship.265 Experts have discred-
ited the idea that a man beats his female partner simply because 
they are in a relationship.266 Intimate partner violence against 
262. See cases cited supra note 78 and accompanying text.
263. The Attorney General further instructed that the BIA, immigration judges, and all 
asylum officers must require an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based 
on membership in a particular social group to provide, “on the record and before the im-
migration judge, the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.” The Attor-
ney General instructed that the BIA cannot consider a social group articulation that was not 
first presented to or analyzed by the immigration judge. See In re A-B-, 27 I. &. N. Dec. at 
344. In Grace v. Whitaker, the court recognized that although Matter of A-B- does not apply 
this exact delineation requirement to a credible fear determination, the DHS Policy Memo-
randum does apply such a requirement to a credible fear determination. No. 18-cv-01853 
(EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *20 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). The court found the DHS Policy Memorandum’s exact delineation re-
quirement in the context of a credible fear determination to be contrary to immigration 
law, arbitrary and capricious. Id.
264. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338–39.
265. Id.
266. See note 178 supra; Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39–40; Reply Brief
for Respondent A-B-, supra note 226, at 8 (quoting Expert Declaration of Nancy Lemon 
¶¶ 2, 81) (opining that “gender is one of the main motivating factors, if not the primary fac-
tor, for domestic violence” and that the specific facts in this case establish that “gender was 
the primary motivating factor of [the] batterer’s abuse”). While the Reply Brief is publicly 
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women occurs because of the abuser’s perception that the woman 
is subordinate to him, and this perception is reinforced by the so-
ciety’s acceptance of her subordinate status in the relationship.267
The requisite nexus can still be established where there is a preex-
isting personal relationship.268 Concluding otherwise would prevent 
eligibility for asylum for women who have suffered or refused FGM 
imposed by family members or women who flee honor killings by 
family members.269 A blanket assertion that a preexisting relation-
ship prevents nexus is in conflict with the requirements that asy-
lum determinations be made based on the context in which the 
persecution occurred and rely on the evidence presented.270
There is no requirement that a persecutor must seek to harm all 
group members in order to establish nexus. The question of nexus 
available, the appended Expert Declaration does not appear to be publicly available besides 
the excerpts in the Reply Brief. See also NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 21 (“it is 
well established that domestic violence is rooted in power and control.”); Robins, supra note
36, at 436–37; Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; Musalo, A Short History, supra note 44, at 
49; see also Taylor Markey, Comment, Westernized Women?: The Construction of Muslim Women’s
Dissent in U.S. Asylum Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1302, 1322 (2017) (stating that in asylum law 
and international human rights law, “gender has been historically depoliticized—cast as pri-
vate, personal, and cultural”).
267. See sources cited supra note 252.
268. Reply Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 226, at 8 n.4 (citing Faruk v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“There is no exception to the asylum statute for violence 
from family members; if the government is unable or unwilling to control persecution, it 
matters not who inflicts it.”); Brief of Tahirih Justice Center, the Asian Pacific Institute on 
Gender-Based Violence, ASISTA Immigration Assistance, and Casa de Esperanza as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21, In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (B.I.A. 2018) (quoting 
Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2010)) (“[If] there is a nexus between the 
persecution and the membership in a particular social group, the simultaneous existence of 
a personal dispute does not eliminate that nexus.”), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-
cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 17–18, 21; NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 20 (asserting that Ses-
sions’s analysis of the persecution suffered by A-R-C-G- as harm occurring exclusively in the 
context of a personal relationship “ignores established sociological evidence regarding do-
mestic violence and country condition evidence regarding gender violence in Central Amer-
ica.”).
269. See Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that the threat of 
honor killing against Ms. Sarhan by her brother was not based on a “personal dispute,” but 
on “a widely-held social norm in Jordan” entitling “male members of families dishonored by 
perceived bad acts of female relatives to kill those women.”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
357, 366–67 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that nexus was established because aunt and husband 
planned to force Ms. Kasinga to undergo FGM to overcome sexual characteristics of young 
women in order to assure male dominance and exploitation); Reply Brief for Respondent 
A-B-, supra note 226, at 8, n.4.
270. Id.; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 20; NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 20; see Martinez-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33, 40 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding 
that the applicant’s comparison to Matter of A-R-C-G- “does her no favors” because Matter of 
A-B- overruled A-R-C-G- and interpreted “the ‘causal connection’ and ‘government nexus’
prongs of persecution analysis to exclude most domestic violence harms from satisfying that 
definition.”).
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concerns the abuser’s motives in harming his spouse or partner.271
This is a fact acknowledged by U.S. circuit courts and DHS.272 Fur-
ther, such a requirement is illogical. If a society allows members of 
one race to hold members of another race in slavery and a slave 
owner beats his own slave, but not other slaves, this does not pre-
vent a finding that the slave owner was motivated by his slave’s race 
in beating him.273 Nor does a neo-Nazi burning down the house of 
only one African-American prevent a finding that he was motivated 
by the person’s race in burning down the house.274
Moreover, there is no requirement that a persecutor must be 
aware of the legally defined particular social group, “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”275
271. Reply Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 226, at 8; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 19; NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22.
272. Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 656–57 (explaining that the fact that Ms. Sarhan’s brother had
not killed others had no impact on whether his persecution of Ms. Sarhan was on account of 
her membership in a particular social group); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 34.
273. As explained in the proposed regulations:
In some cases, a persecutor may in fact target an individual victim because of a 
shared characteristic, even though the persecutor does not act against others who 
possess the same characteristic. For example, in a society in which members of 
one race hold members of another race in slavery, that society may expect that 
a slaveowner who beats his own slave would not beat the slave of his neighbor. It 
would nevertheless be reasonable to conclude that the beating is centrally moti-
vated by the victim’s race. Similarly, in some cases involving domestic violence, an 
applicant may be able to establish that the abuser is motivated to harm her be-
cause of her gender or because of her status in a domestic relationship. This may 
be a characteristic that she shares with other women in her society, some of whom 
are also at risk of harm from their partners on account of this shared characteris-
tic. Thus, it may be possible in some cases for a victim of domestic violence to sat-
isfy the “on account of” requirement, even though social limitations and other 
factors result in the abuser having the opportunity, and indeed the motivation, to 
harm only one of the women who share this characteristic, because only one of 
these women is in a domestic relationship with the abuser.
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); see also DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 34; CGRS PRACTICE 
ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 19.
274. Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 656–57 (“Imagine the neo-Nazi who burns down the house of 
an African-American family. We would never say that this was a personal dispute because the 
neo-Nazi did not burn down all of the houses belonging to African-Americans in the 
town.”).
275. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 
U.S. 478, 483 (1992)); DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62 (stating that direct and circumstantial 
evidence of the persecutor’s motive may establish nexus); NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra 
note 187, at 12 (citing Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483; Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, 616 F.3d 
711, 715 (7th Cir. 2010)) (noting that a requirement to provide evidence that the persecu-
tor is aware of the specific particular social group would be contrary to “well-established case 
law finding that nexus can be proven through direct and circumstantial evidence.”); see also
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 18 (“Requiring each modifier [in the group 
definition] to be an independent, central reason for the persecution could make it nearly 
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The applicant is not required to establish the persecutor’s motiva-
tion in relation to each term included in the identified particular 
social group or even the persecutor’s exact motivation, as such evi-
dence would be nearly impossible to obtain from a persecutor.276
The Attorney General appeared to imply that an applicant must 
establish that her membership in the group is the abuser’s central, 
or even sole, motivation. The Real ID Act unambiguously provides:
To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the 
meaning of such section, the applicant must establish that 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion was or will be at least one cen-
tral reason for persecuting the applicant.277
Any interpretation to the contrary would conflict with the plain 
language of the statute.278 Membership in the particular social 
group does not need to be even a “dominant central reason for 
persecution.”279 Rather, it must only play “more than a minor role 
in motivating the persecutor.”280
In the context of Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, the motiva-
tion of the abuser was the woman’s subordinate status in their rela-
tionship and society’s acceptance of that view. This motivation was 
established by evidence of the abusers’ statements and actions 
seeking to control them, exert his domination over them, and the 
belief that he had a right to do so to a woman in a relationship 
impossible for petitioners to successfully navigate the legal requirements for asylum and 
withholding of removal.”) (citing Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 n.4 (4th Cir. 2015)).
276. NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 12; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra
note 187, at 18 (citing Mustafa v. Holder, 707 F.3d 743, 752 (7th Cir. 2013); Ali v. Ashcroft,
394 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2005); Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1030 (2d Cir. 1994); Temu v. 
Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 892 (4th Cir. 2014); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483; Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 108–
09 (3d Cir. 2010)).
277. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (emphasis added).
278. In Grace v. Whitaker, the court found that the Attorney General in Matter of A-B- had 
not established a new standard for the nexus requirement in the context of credible fear 
determinations and had articulated the correct “at least one central reason” standard. No. 
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *24 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-
501 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
279. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39 (quoting Quinteros-Mendoza v. 
Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009)).
280. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 688 n.6 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Shaikh v. Holder, 702 
F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2012)).
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with him, and evidence of society’s treatment of violence against 
women by intimate partners.281
D. Persecution
The Attorney General asserted that the BIA defines persecution 
using three elements: (1) “‘Persecution’ involves an intent to target 
a belief or characteristic;”282 (2) “[T]he level of harm must be ‘se-
vere;’”283 (3) “[T]he harm or suffering must be ‘inflicted either by 
the government of a country or by persons or an organization that 
the government was unable or unwilling to control.’”284
Regarding the first element, relying on Matter of Kasinga, Ses-
sions explained that “private criminals are motivated more often by 
greed or vendettas than by an intent to ‘overcome [the protected] 
characteristic of the victim.’”285 Although the BIA in Matter of 
Kasinga provided that “persecution can consist of the infliction of 
harm or suffering by a government, or persons a government is 
unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the 
victim,” the BIA did not suggest that “private criminals are motivat-
ed more often by greed or vendettas.”286 In support of his assertion, 
Attorney General Sessions further relied on the BIA’s vacated deci-
sion in Matter of R-A-, in which the BIA found that the applicant’s
husband was motivated to abuse her because she was his wife, not 
because she was “a member of some broader collection of wom-
en.”287 Here, the Attorney General confused the issue of “persecu-
tion” with the issue of “nexus,” or whether the persecution is “on 
account of” the particular social group identified.288 Regardless, 
Sessions wholly disregarded the reasons for the husband’s abuse of
281. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 39–
40; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 8; DHS R-A- Brief, supra note 62, at 26–
28, 35–36.
282. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337–38 (A.G. 2018) (citing In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 40, 44 n.2 (B.I.A. 2017)), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 
WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
283. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38 (citing In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 172–73 
(B.I.A. 2007)).
284. Id. (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985)).
285. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.
286. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 222–23).
287. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (quoting In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 920 (B.I.A. 
2001)).
288. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 921.
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his wife: that she was a woman subject to his subordination.289 The 
husband targeted the wife because she was a woman, and he used
the abuse “to affirm his dominance over her.”290
As to the second element, the Attorney General recognized that 
“private violence” may be “severe.”291 He further recognized that 
the applicant in Matter of A-R-C-G- suffered abuse that was “suffi-
ciently severe.”292 As to the third element, the Attorney General 
correctly stated the requirement throughout his decision that if 
persons other than the government inflict the harm, the govern-
ment must be unable or unwilling to control them. However, Ses-
sions appeared to raise the standard of “unable or unwilling” to a 
much higher, and possibly impossible to meet, standard.293 He as-
serted, “[t]he applicant must show that the government condoned 
the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete helpless-
ness to protect the victims.”294
289. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 939 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting) (cit-
ing Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal taken from 
Eng.)) (asserting that the husband acted on account of the applicant’s gender, their rela-
tionship, and the fact that he knew “as a woman subject to his subordination, the respond-
ent would receive no protection from the authorities if she resisted his abuse and persecu-
tion”); see supra note 268.
290. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 941 (B.I.A. 2001) (Guendelsberger, Board Member, 
dissenting) (citing Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.)); see supra note 268.
291. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.
292. Id.
293. In fact, in Grace v. Whitaker, the court found that Matter of A-B- created a new 
heightened requirement for establishing “persecution” in the context of non-state actor per-
secution. Specifically, the Attorney General established a requirement that the government 
“condone” the persecution or be completely helpless to protect the victims, as opposed to 
the “unable or unwilling” requirement established in Matter of Acosta. Grace v. Whitaker, No. 
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *22 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-
501 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). The court recognized that under this new construction of 
“persecution,” “no asylum applicant who received assistance from the government, regard-
less of how ineffective that assistance was, could meet the persecution requirement when the 
persecutor is a non-government actor.” The court found that the term “persecution” was not 
ambiguous, that the new heightened standard established in Matter of A-B- was inconsistent 
with immigration laws, and that the Matter of A-B- standard cannot be applied in credible 
fear determinations. Id. at *21. Further, the Court rejected the government’s reliance on 
U.S. circuit court cases that used the words “condone” or “complete helplessness” because 
the courts in those cases did not actually apply such a heightened standard. Id. at *22. Ra-
ther, the courts applied the unable and unwilling standard, and the court in Grace v. Whita-
ker was not required to defer to the government’s interpretation of U.S. circuit court prece-
dent. Id. at *23.
294. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38 (citing Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 
2000); Hor v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Dara Lind, Exclusive: How 
Asylum Officers are Being Told to Implement Sessions’s New Rules, VOX (June 19, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/19/17476662/asylum-border-sessions 
(reporting on a new USCIS memo directing asylum officers to use a “complete helplessness”
standard).
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1.  An Unable or Unwilling Government
To the extent the Attorney General attempted to elevate the re-
quirement that the government was “unable or unwilling” to pro-
tect to a requirement that the government “condoned” or was 
“completely helpless,” it is inconsistent with Matter of Acosta, the 
standard applied in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- upon 
which he so emphatically relied.295 Such a heightened standard is 
also inconsistent with the requirement of well-founded fear of per-
secution. Further, the cases upon which he relies do not actually 
support the recognition of such a standard.296
The BIA in Matter of Acosta found that the interpretation of “per-
secution” by the BIA and U.S. circuit courts prior to the 1980 Ref-
ugee Act should apply to the term in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the 
Act. This interpretation includes the requirement that the “harm 
or suffering had to be inflicted either by the government of a 
country or by persons or an organization that the government was 
unable or unwilling to control.”297 The Attorney General cited to 
no subsequent BIA precedent for such a heightened standard.298 In 
fact, the BIA in both Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- recog-
nized the “unable or unwilling” standard.299
Further, a heightened standard would require a different result 
in cases such as Matter of Kasinga.300 The evidence presented in that 
295. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Whether a gov-
ernment is ‘unable or unwilling to control’ private actors . . . is a factual question that must 
be resolved based on the record.”) (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th 
Cir. 2005)).
296. See CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 21–22; NIJL PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 24.
297. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222–23 (B.I.A. 1985) (citing McMullen v. INS, 658 
F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 
(B.I.A. 1987); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971), In re McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec. 
542, 544–45 (B.I.A. 1980), In re Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975)).
298. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38.
299. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014); see In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 208, 224 n.8 (B.I.A. 2014). U.S. circuit court cases citing Matter of A-B- in regard to the 
standard in non-state-actor persecution cases have continued to apply the “unable or unwill-
ing” standard. See Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 164 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding that 
evidence of a police investigation did not demonstrate that a government was able to pro-
vide protection); Tacam-Garcia v. Whitaker, 744 F. App’x 226, 227 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding 
that there were several instances where the authorities and the court helped the applicant 
and as such, she failed to demonstrate that the government was unable or unwilling to con-
trol the alleged persecution by her husband).
300. Notably, both Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- analyzed Matter of Kasinga in 
regard to the requirements of membership in a particular social group to evidence that the 
result would not be different. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238, 240, 245–46; In re W-
G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217–18.
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case, similar to Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, showed that 
FGM was widely practiced by the police, the government of Togo 
had a poor human rights record, and most African women could 
expect little governmental protection from FGM.301 Such evidence 
may not meet a standard that the government “condoned” FGM or 
was “completely helpless.”
The BIA and U.S. circuit courts have recognized that even when 
an applicant does not report harm to the police, this does not pre-
vent a finding that the government was unable or unwilling to pro-
tect her if she can establish that such reporting would be futile.302
Further, other bases for a victim’s failure to report abuse may exist, 
such as fear of retribution, shame, or financial, religious, cultural, 
moral, or legal constraints.303 An applicant may be putting her life 
at risk by reporting abuse to the police.304 If she is already aware 
that the police will do nothing to respond to her complaints of 
abuse, presumably there would be no incentive to endanger herself 
further by making a futile report. Additionally, there may be well-
founded concerns about losing any societal or financial support or 
even custody of her children.305
301. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
302. See Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007); In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding that although the applicant did not seek protection 
from the government, if she had done so the Moroccan authorities would have been unable 
or unwilling to protect her); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 
4:11 (Thompson Reuters 2018); see also Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950–54 
(4th Cir. 2015) (finding that the applicant might be eligible for asylum even though she did 
not report the persecution to government authorities); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra 
note 190, at 41; Coven Memorandum, supra note 69 (“Breaching social mores . . . may result 
in harm, abuse or harsh treatment that is distinguishable from the treatment given the gen-
eral population, frequently without meaningful recourse to state protection.”).
303. Factors that influence a battered woman’s behavior include:
(1) fear of retaliation; (2) the economic (and other tangible) resources available 
to her; (3) her concern for her children; (4) her emotional attachment to her 
partner; (5) her personal emotional strengths, such as hope or optimism; (6) her 
race, ethnicity, and culture; (7) her emotional, mental, and physical vulnerabili-
ties; and (8) her perception of the availability of social support.
Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1232 (1993).
304. In fact, it is widely recognized in the United States that victims are in the most dan-
ger at the moment they make a decision to separate. This issue is termed “separation as-
sault,” which describes an attack that seeks to block a woman from leaving, retaliate for her 
leaving, or end the separation by force. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Wom-
en: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991). The existence of protective 
orders and shelters is recognition of the extreme danger of separation assault. Id. at 68.
305. Dutton, supra note 303, at 1233 (discussing why abused women may fear leaving 
their partner or taking legal action); see also In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 
2014) (identifying some of these challenges), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 
2018); Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of Domestic Violence, 81 
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Nevertheless, in both Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, the
applicants reported the abuse to the police who were unable and 
unwilling to provide protection. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the applicant 
made many attempts to obtain protection from police, but they 
told her that they would not interfere in a marital relationship.306
In Matter of A-B-, the police required the applicant to personally de-
liver a protection order to the abuser.307 Not only did this put her 
life at risk, but it further supported the abuser’s belief that he 
could abuse her and nothing would be done about his actions. The 
police never enforced the restraining orders. After her abuser at-
tacked her with a knife, the police told her they could not help 
her.308
The Attorney General’s statements that domestic violence is a 
difficult crime to prosecute and “complete security” and “perfect 
protection” are not required ignore the underlying basis for a gov-
ernment’s failure to provide protection.309 A government may be 
unable or unwilling to enact laws to provide protections to women 
who are being abused by their partners or enforce any laws actually 
enacted because of the government’s and society’s perception that 
women are subordinate to men or women in domestic relation-
ships are considered subordinate to men and undeserving of pro-
tection.310 If the police and prosecutors will not enforce the protec-
tions available to protect against domestic violence, no protections 
exist. 
Even assuming that the police attempt to provide protection to a 
victim, but are unable to do so because of insufficient resources, 
this would demonstrate a government’s inability to provide protec-
tion. It could also potentially demonstrate an unwillingness to pro-
vide protection, to the extent the government refuses to provide 
sufficient resources.311 While the “persistence” of domestic violence 
FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 857, 878 (2012) (recognizing that barriers to a victim separating from 
an abusive partner may include the victim’s fear that the abuser will physically retaliate or a
belief that custody of their children, money, housing, or other factors are at stake).
306. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389.
307. Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 41.
308. Id. at 4.
309. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 343–44 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, 
No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
310. See supra notes 133, 291.
311. The law does not require an applicant to demonstrate that a government is both
“unable” and “unwilling” to provide protection—if either is true, an applicant can meet the 
requirement of non-state actor persecution. See In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316; CGRS
PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 25 nn.106–07 (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y
Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 289 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (“If anything, the evidence that gang violence is a 
serious problem in Honduras provides additional support for Galdamez’s claims [of gov-
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in a country or a government’s “difficulty” policing domestic vio-
lence may not necessarily demonstrate a government’s unwilling-
ness to protect,312 it does support the government’s inability to pro-
vide protection.313
By relying on the example of the “persistence” of domestic vio-
lence in the United States, the Attorney General further ignored 
the United States’ history of treating intimate partner violence as a 
private matter outside the scope of government protection. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, it is only in the last thirty years that 
state and federal laws in the United States have made efforts to 
strengthen and ensure the enforcement of intimate partner vio-
lence laws. Given U.S. history, it is entirely conceivable that other 
countries are unable or unwilling to provide protections to victims 
of intimate partner violence. 
Requiring a government’s “complete helplessness” to establish 
persecution by a non-state actor conflicts with the INA’s “well-
founded fear” provision.314 An individual would have to demon-
strate that her government would be completely helpless to protect 
her from persecution by a non-state actor. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has rejected the argument that well-founded fear requires a 
showing of “clear probability” of the persecution, finding that a 
well-founded fear can be based on a less than fifty percent chance 
of the persecution happening.315 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
recognized that even a ten percent chance of persecution might 
establish a well-founded fear.316 A requirement that the govern-
ernment inability to protect].”); Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Even 
if Afriyie’s ability to file a police report suggests that the police were willing to protect Afri-
yie, that says little if anything about whether they were able to do so.”); Gathungu v. Holder,
725 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he very fact that the Mungiki have continued to cre-
ate significant violence over the last decade despite repeated assertions by the Kenyan gov-
ernment that it is cracking down . . . show the Kenyan government is unable to control the 
Mungiki.”)).
312. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec at 316, 344.
313. See supra note 311.
314. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22.
315. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); see also CGRS PRACTICE 
ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22. Compare 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b), 1208.13(b) (2018), with 8 
C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b), 1208.16(b) (2018) (showing that withholding of removal under the 
relevant sections requires a higher burden of proof than is required for asylum).
316. That the fear must be “well-founded” does not alter the obvious focus on the indi-
vidual’s subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a “more likely than not”
one. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). One can certainly have a well-
founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a fifty percent chance of the 
occurrence taking place. As one leading authority has pointed out:
Let us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant’s country of origin every 
tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor 
camp . . . . In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has man-
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ment is completely helpless or has no chance of being able to pro-
vide protection conflicts with the acknowledgement that even less 
than a fifty percent chance of persecution happening can establish 
a well-founded fear of persecution. 
Moreover, to the extent the Attorney General asserted a higher 
“complete helplessness” standard, it exceeds even the standard re-
quired in cases under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An 
applicant applying for protection under CAT must demonstrate 
that the state inflicted or would consent to or acquiesce to the ap-
plicant’s torture, a standard that is considered higher than that re-
quired for asylum.317 Acquiescence is defined under the regulations 
as requiring that the “public official, prior to the activity constitut-
ing torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach 
his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activi-
ty.”318 As such, even under CAT, there is no requirement that a 
government “condone” or be “completely helpless.” The govern-
ment only needs to be “aware that torture of the sort feared by the 
applicant occurs and remain willfully blind to it.”319 U.S. circuit 
courts, even in cases where the government has made attempts to 
provide protection to the victim, have found that the government 
met CAT’s higher standard of “consent” and “acquiescence.”320
2. Relocation
Asylum regulations already provide a distinction between perse-
cution by state actors and non-state actors in the required analysis 
related to relocation.321 An applicant who fears persecution by a 
state actor is presumed to be unable to relocate despite a lack of 
aged to escape from the country in question will have “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted’ upon his eventual return.”
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966); see also
CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 22.
317. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2018); NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 24–25 
n.21 (citing In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1312–13 (B.I.A. 2000); Rodriguez-Molinero v. 
Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra 
note 187, at 23 n.94.
318. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18, 1208.18 (2018).
319. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2013); see CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 23 n.96.
320. CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 23 n.95 (citing Rodriguez-Molinero v. 
Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (7th Cir. 2015); De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 109–11 
(2d Cir. 2010)).
321. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(3)(ii), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2018); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY,
supra note 187, at 27; NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 26.
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past persecution.322 When the applicant has established past perse-
cution by a non-state actor on account of one of the five grounds 
for asylum, including particular social group, she is presumed to 
have a well-founded fear of persecution on the same basis.323 DHS 
bears the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that she does not have a well-founded fear of future perse-
cution because she could avoid persecution and it would be rea-
sonable to expect the applicant to relocate under all the 
circumstances.324
The Attorney General stated, in dicta, that “[w]hen the appli-
cant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few specific 
individuals, internal relocation would seem more reasonable than 
if the applicant were persecuted, broadly, by her country’s gov-
ernment.”325 Sessions provided no opinion specifically as to wheth-
er it would be reasonable for Ms. A-B- to relocate. Nevertheless, his 
speculation on relocation when an applicant has suffered harm 
from only a few individuals has no basis in the INA or regulations. 
Regardless of the number of individuals perpetrating the harm or 
threatening the harm, relocation must allow her to successfully 
avoid persecution and be reasonable under the totality of the cir-
cumstances.326
Even when only one individual perpetrates the harm, an appli-
cant may not successfully and safely relocate. For instance, in both 
Matter of A-R-C-G- and Matter of A-B-, the abusers were able to find 
the applicants when they fled to other areas.327 Further, asylum 
regulations provide a “non-exhaustive list of factors” to consider in 
determining whether relocation is reasonable, including “whether 
the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of sug-
gested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; ad-
ministrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical lim-
itations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, 
322. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(3)(ii), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2018).
323. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), (b)(3)(ii); id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), (b)(3)(ii).
324. Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii), 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
325. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 345 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 
18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018).
326. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2018) (mentioning no criterion for the number of 
potential persecutors necessary to seek asylum); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b), 1203.13(b) (2018)
(describing the eligibility requirements for asylum seekers without making any mention of a 
minimum number of potential persecutors); see also CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 
187, at 26; NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 26.
327. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & 
N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Brief for Respondent A-B-, supra note 190, at 42–43.
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health, and social and familial ties.”328 An analysis based solely on 
the fact that there is only one individual perpetrating the harm 
would entirely ignore the reasonableness consideration of the re-
location inquiry. 
E. Credibility
The Attorney General concluded that the BIA erred in finding 
the immigration judge’s credibility determinations in Matter of A-B-
to be clearly erroneous because the BIA failed “to give adequate 
deference to the credibility determinations and improperly substi-
tuted its own assessment of the evidence.”329 While a credibility de-
termination allows the adjudicator significant latitude in her analy-
sis of credibility, the REAL ID Act requires the determination to be 
made under “the totality of circumstances,” considering the appli-
cant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness”; “the inherent plau-
sibility” of the account; “the consistency” of the applicant’s state-
ments; and “any inaccuracies or falsehoods” in those statements,
regardless of whether the “inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 
goes to the heart” of the claim.330 This does not give the adjudica-
tor unrestricted discretion to make an adverse credibility determi-
nation. 
Any such determination must be made “considering the totality 
of the circumstances.” The adjudicator must “present a reasoned 
analysis of the evidence as a whole.”331 An adjudicator cannot rely 
solely on facts supporting an adverse credibility determination and 
ignore the facts that do not support an adverse credibility determi-
nation.332 A failure to engage in a reasoned analysis of the totality 
328. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(B)(3), 1208.13(b)(3) (2018); NIJC PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra 
note 187, at 26.
329. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 341.
330. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) 2018); see also CGRS
PRACTICE ADVISORY supra note 187, at 28 (“[A]djudicators cannot ‘cherry pick solely facts 
favoring an adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that undermine that re-
sult.’”) (quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010)).
331. Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088,1091 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tamang v. Hold-
er, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th 
Cir. 2006).
332. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 
F.3d at 700; Shah v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2006); CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY
supra note 187, at 28 n.122 (suggesting that adjudicators must allow an applicant to explain 
discrepancies, and citing Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2006); Soto-Olarte 
v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2009); Pang v. USCIS, 448 F.3d 102, 109–11 (2d 
Cir. 2006)); see also Tang v. Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009); Ai Jun Zhi, 751 
F.3d at 1091.
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of the evidence would support a clearly erroneous finding on cred-
ibility by the adjudicator.333 Further, an adjudicator’s failure to al-
low an applicant to explain any inconsistencies or omissions before 
an adverse credibility determination would likewise support a 
clearly erroneous finding on credibility by the adjudicator.334 There 
are many reasons for inconsistencies or omissions by an applicant 
during the process of her case, including fear of the process, lin-
guistic and cultural barriers, trauma, and lack of familiarity with 
the law on asylum.335
Moreover, intimate partner violence-based asylum claims face 
significant evidentiary hurdles because of the fact that a private ac-
tor inflicts the persecution within a home.336 There are rarely po-
lice reports because such reports are likely to have been futile and 
potentially endanger the victim.337 The victim is likely to be unable
to obtain any letters or assistance in obtaining evidence from fami-
ly members with the most knowledge about the abuse for fear of 
retribution from the abusive partner.338 Hospital records indicating 
any injuries is rare.339 Yet, as demonstrated in Matter of A-B-, a vic-
tim’s confusion related to the timeline and details of events can 
trump the significance of any evidence corroborating her story.340
The failure to resolve the primary interpretative barriers to gen-
der-based asylum claims in any meaningful way—through prece-
dent, legislation, regulation, or otherwise—has allowed the flawed 
analysis in Matter of R-A- to reemerge in Matter of A-B-. The Attorney 
General’s decision is rooted in Matter of R-A-’s misconception that 
intimate partner violence against a female partner is a private mat-
ter which occurs because of the relationship between the parties. 
As such, it is impossible for a government to provide “complete se-
curity” from such a private harm. By returning to this private mat-
ter perception, he ignored the true source of intimate partner vio-
lence and a government’s inability or unwillingness to provide 
protection: societal expectations of gender and subordination. Ses-
sions further ignored the efforts made in U.S. domestic violence 
333. See Ai Jun Zhi, 751 F.3d at 1091; Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040.
334. See cases cited supra note 332.
335. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–62; CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 187, at 28.
336. See Robins, supra note 36, at 457–63 (discussing the barriers to corroboration in pri-
vate claims); see also Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, EURO. PARL. DOC. (PE 
462.481) 60–69 (2012) (acknowledging that gender-related persecution is difficult to prove 
and analyzing issues of credibility and evidence in gender-related asylum claims in Europe).
337. See Robins, supra note 36, at 454, 462–63.
338. Id. at 451, 465.
339. Id. at 462–63.
340. See, e.g., Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 288–89 (6th Cir. 2016).
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laws to combat this erroneous perception and ensure that safe-
guards are provided to prevent this perception from exposing 
women who are victims of intimate partner violence to further 
harm. 
The future of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence 
once again looks bleak. The determinations and reasoning of asy-
lum officers, immigration judges, and the BIA in these cases will 
continue to be unpredictable and disconnected.341
III. THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM CLAIMS BASED ON INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE DIVERGES FROM HOW INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE IS TREATED IN THE UNITED STATES
Historically, many countries, including the United States, ac-
cepted the abuse of women by their husbands or intimate partners 
as a private matter that did not warrant state intervention.342 While 
U.S. state and federal domestic violence laws and judicial training 
have made some progress in rectifying this “private matter” percep-
341. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2525; Bookey, supra note 142, at 109–10. In a footnote 
to the Matter of A-B- decision, the Attorney General encouraged asylum adjudicators to con-
sider negative discretionary considerations before making an asylum determination, even 
when the statutory eligibility for asylum has been established. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 
345 n.12 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, No. 18-cv-01853 (EGS), 2018 WL 
6628081 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018). He relied on Matter of Pula to support his list of negative 
discretionary considerations. In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987), superseded in part by 
regulation on other grounds, 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(e) (1995), as recognized in Andriasian v. INS, 180 
F.3d 1033, 1043–44, 1044 n.17 (9th Cir. 1999). However, Matter of Pula specifically provided
additional positive considerations for determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion 
is warranted, including “general humanitarian considerations.” Id. at 474. Additionally, the 
BIA explained that “the discretionary factors should be carefully evaluated in light of the 
unusually harsh consequences which may befall an alien who has established a well-founded 
fear of persecution; the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most 
egregious of adverse factors.” Id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., PRACTICE 
ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 30 n.35 (2019), https://
immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/page/documents/2019-01/
Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201.2019%20Update%20-
%20Final.pdf. In Grace v. Whitaker, the court determined that Matter of A-B- did not allow for 
the exercise of discretion in the context of credible fear determinations. No. 18-cv-0183 
(EGS), 2018 WL 6628081, at *26 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-501 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 30, 2019).
342. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know 
that for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 7, 13 (2004); see also Rabin, supra note 9, at 111–112 (discussing the history of 
legal protection for domestic violence victims); Reva B. Siegel, ”The Rule of Love”: Wife Beat-
ing as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) (discussing the history of legal treat-
ment of domestic abuse in the United States).
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tion,343 Matter of A-B- demonstrates that this perception remains 
alive and well in the context of asylum. The Attorney General’s de-
cision reflects a lack of understanding of the impact that social and 
cultural norms of gender inequality have on the treatment of vic-
tims of intimate partner violence in a country.344 Even if this fact 
was arguably acknowledged in the case, it is disregarded in Ses-
sions’s ultimate determination. 
Notwithstanding the more recent awareness and drive for legal 
reform to combat intimate partner violence internationally,345
countries’ ability to institute and enforce laws to protect women 
from violence by their intimate partners has proven to be a tre-
mendous challenge. In many instances, countries may have laws in 
place for prosecution of intimate partner violence crimes, but they
are unable to enforce these laws through police or the judiciary or 
lack the political will to do so. 
The refusal of the Attorney General and adjudicators in asylum 
cases to consider barriers to enforcement of domestic violence laws 
and seeking police protection in other countries is in stark contrast 
to the attention given to these issues in the context of intimate 
partner violence crimes that are committed in the United States.
Since the 1970s, the federal and state legal systems’ response to in-
timate partner violence has changed dramatically.346 Prior to 1970, 
the criminal justice system treated intimate partner violence as a 
private matter with few options to protect victims.347
The Department of Justice’s 1984 Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Task Force on Family Violence348 was one of the first steps 
towards a significant advancement in the response to intimate 
partner violence in the criminal justice system in the United 
States.349 This report identified the criminal justice system’s issues 
343. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the 
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999); Jonathan 
Lippman, Ensuring Victim Safety and Abuser Accountability: Reforms and Revisions in New York 
Courts’ Response to Domestic Violence, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1417 (2012); Rabin, supra note 9;
Siegel, supra note 342. See generally Goodmark, supra note 342(discussing federal, state and 
community responses to domestic violence since the 1970s).
344. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; Rabin, supra note 9, at 111–12; Randall, supra 
note 40, at 531.
345. See, e.g., Musalo & Knight, supra note 36, at 57–58.
346. See Goodmark, supra note 342; Rabin, supra note 9, at 113–18; Siegel, supra note 
342.
347. See Goodmark, supra note 342; Rabin, supra note 9, at 113–18; Siegel, supra note 
342.
348. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, CG017891,
FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 10–16 (1984).
349. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 13–14.
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in intimate partner violence cases and provided recommendations 
for change.350 Since the 1984 Report, significant progress has been 
made in the protection of victims of intimate partner violence 
which occurs inside the United States.351 States passed new manda-
tory arrest laws and “no-drop policies.”352 Through mandatory ar-
rest laws, police are required to make an arrest when there is prob-
able cause to support that an intimate partner violence crime was 
committed.353 These laws were intended to ensure that police re-
spond to intimate partner violence crimes and provide protection 
to the victim, thereby increasing victims’ trust in the police.354
These laws have had an important impact on increased arrest rates 
in intimate partner violence cases.355
At the same time, in response to victim reluctance to support 
charges against their abuser or to testify against their abuser, pros-
ecutors’ offices began instituting “no-drop” policies that required
prosecutors to move forward with intimate partner violence cases 
when sufficient evidence existed.356 The reluctance of victims to 
support charges against their abusive partner, or even report 
abuse, may stem from fear of retribution by the abuser, the abus-
er’s continued psychological control over the victim, concerns 
about the loss of financial support from the abuser, loss of child 
custody, religious and cultural reasons, issues of self-esteem, and 
lack of education, among many others.357 States passed civil protec-
tion order statutes to protect the victim from the abuser so that the 
victim is able to leave.358 In further efforts to alleviate these fears, 
states enacted laws on child custody and visitation protections for 
victims and created community resources for victims to receive 
support.359
In addition to state protections for victims of intimate partner 
violence, in 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA).360 VAWA provides funding and support for police de-
partments that institute pro-arrest policies in intimate partner vio-
350. See id.
351. See generally Goodmark, supra note 342 (discussing federal, state and community 
responses to domestic violence since the 1970s).
352. See id. at 15–19; Rabin, supra note 9, at 115.




357. Dutton, supra note 303, at 1232–33; see also Kuennen, supra note 305, at 857, 878.
358. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 10–11; Rabin, supra note 9, at 115.
359. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 11–13; Rabin, supra note 9, at 114–15.
360. Goodmark, supra note 342, at 8–9; Rabin, supra note 9, at 116.
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lence cases and provide training for police officers, judges, and 
prosecutors on violence against women. It also created federal 
penalties related to violence against women and required states to 
enforce protection orders entered in other state courts.361 As a part 
of VAWA, Congress provided undocumented women who have suf-
fered intimate partner violence by U.S. citizens or permanent resi-
dents, as well as the undocumented women’s children, with a path 
towards permanent residency. It also provided for cancellation of 
removal without the assistance or knowledge of the abuser in an 
effort to prevent abusers from using the victim’s undocumented 
status to continue his control over the victim.362 VAWA also created 
the U-visa, which allows non-citizen victims of serious crimes in the 
United States who are assisting in the investigation or prosecution 
of the crime to obtain non-immigrant status and a path towards 
permanent residency.363
Many states and jurisdictions have instituted training programs 
for judges who handle intimate partner violence-related matters.364
These education and training programs work to eliminate judicial 
bias and foster neutrality and understanding in intimate partner 
violence cases.365 Training may include sessions on the misconcep-
tions of the dynamics of intimate partner violence and its effect on 
victims, psychology of intimate partner violence victims, applicable 
law and procedure, and cultural and linguistic issues.366
In contrast to the numerous protection avenues available to 
women, including undocumented women, who suffer intimate 
partner violence in the United States, women who flee intimate 
partner violence that occurs in a foreign country are limited to the 
antiquated constraints of asylum law to obtain protection.367 De-
spite public awareness in the United States of the problem of inti-
mate partner violence and substantial progress in federal and state 
law combating it, asylum law trails behind by almost fifty years. The 
male-centric lens through which refugee/asylum law developed 
continues to hamper progress in U.S. asylum law relating to inti-
mate partner violence.
361. See Goodmark, supra note 342, at 9; Rabin, supra note 9, at 116.
362. Lianna E. Donovan, The Violence Against Women Act’s Protection of Immigrant Victims: 
Past, Present, and Proposals for the Future, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 745, 758–62 (2014); Rabin, supra 
note 9, at 116–17.
363. Donovan, supra note 361, at 745, 758–62; Rabin, supra note 9, at 116–17.
364. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343, at 1427–31.
365. See Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343, at 1430.
366. See Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343, at 1430.
367. Rabin, supra note 9, at 125.
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Further, U.S. legal responses to intimate partner violence have 
acknowledged that victims often may not report abuse, support 
criminal charges, or attempt to leave the abuser, and have sought 
to remedy these issues.368 In contrast, it is these precise issues that 
support the denial of an asylum claim because the victim failed to 
report the abuse to the police or demonstrate their inability to 
leave the relationship prior to fleeing to the United States. These 
issues can only be combated through new legislation or regulations 
for asylum adjudications involving intimate partner violence, judi-
cial training and education, and tracking mechanisms for gender-
related asylum cases.
IV. PROVIDING GUIDANCE IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS INVOLVING 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
U.S. asylum law provides no clear guidance on key aspects of the 
refugee definition. This is demonstrated by the well-documented 
history of U.S. jurisprudence on the particular social group catego-
ry in regard to gender and intimate partner violence victims. Guid-
ance is lacking, particularly related to the definition of a particular 
social group as it pertains to these victims, non-state actor persecu-
tion when a state is unable or unwilling to provide protection, and 
the nexus between the non-state actor persecution and the particu-
lar social group ground. The Attorney General’s decision in Matter 
of A-B- provided no clarification or guidance on these issues for ad-
judicators. 
Moreover, although he acknowledged that asylum claims based 
on intimate partner violence must be examined on a case-by-case 
basis, Sessions made a series of generalized statements about why 
these claims are “unlikely” to meet the refugee definition. As a re-
sult, his decision will serve to prejudice adjudicators in their analy-
sis of these claims. Adjudicators will continue to be left to their 
own discretion, leading to drastically different results in asylum 
cases based on intimate partner violence. New legislation or regu-
lations, adjudicator training, and tracking of outcomes of gender-
based asylum claims are essential to creating an environment 
where more consistent and fair adjudications of women’s asylum 
368. Goodmark, supra note 342, at 10–19; Rabin, supra note 9, at 115.
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claims, including those who have suffered intimate partner vio-
lence, are possible.369
A. New Legislation or Regulations
In 2000, before DHS took over asylum adjudications, the INS
published a proposed rule to amend the regulations establishing 
asylum and withholding eligibility.370 The proposed rules aimed to 
provide “generally applicable principles that will allow for case-by-
case adjudication of claims based on domestic violence or other se-
rious harm inflicted by individual non-state actors.”371 In setting out 
these principles, the proposed rule directly addressed the BIA’s
Matter of R-A- decision.372 It removed “certain barriers,” created by 
the Matter of R-A- decision, to claims that domestic violence 
amounts to persecution based on membership in a particular so-
cial group when a government proves to be unwilling or unable to 
give protection.373
The proposed rules highlighted the immutability requirement as 
a key part of its definition of a particular social group.374 In order 
for a characteristic to be immutable, it must be “unchangeable” or 
“fundamental to an applicant’s identity.”375 Gender was considered 
an immutable characteristic within this definition.376 While the 
proposed rules provided a list of additional factors that “may” be 
taken into account in considering whether “a particular social 
group exists,” they are not considered “requirements” in the par-
ticular social group determination.377
Recognizing that the BIA’s conclusion in Matter of R-A- seemed 
to eliminate the possibility that the “on account of” requirement 
369. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2515, 2539 (calling for new regulations to provide 
guidance in intimate partner violence-based asylum claims and noting that “creative argu-
ments based on existing law will not overcome the innate hostility of some adjudicators to 
this type of claim”); see also Bookey, supra note 167, at 11 (asserting that the limitations of 
Matter of A-R-C-G- demonstrate the need for “comprehensive, clear, and binding guidance”
either from the Board or in the form of new regulations).
370. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
371. Id. at 76,589.
372. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001).
373. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 76,593.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 76,594–95.
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would be met when the persecutor did not harm other members of 
the particular social group, the proposed rules stated that this 
should not be “required as a matter of law . . . in order for an ap-
plicant to satisfy the ‘on account of’ requirement.”378 The proposed 
rules explicitly permitted the possibility that victims of domestic vi-
olence may fulfill the “on account of” requirement despite the fact 
that the persecutor had the opportunity and motivation to abuse 
“only one of the women who share this characteristic, because only 
one of these women is in a domestic relationship with the abus-
er.”379
Although these rules represented considerable progress at the 
time in describing the relationship between gender and the par-
ticular social group ground, they were never finalized. Since that 
time, the issues presented in Matter of R-A- remain and progression 
away from these proposed rules have become even more evident in 
Matter of A-B-. The Attorney General’s analysis in Matter of A-B- has 
only further highlighted the need for legislation and regulations to 
combat the continuing challenges to asylum claims based on gen-
der involving intimate partner violence. In conjunction with simi-
lar legislative changes, these proposed rules should be amended 
and finalized by DHS to provide guidance to adjudicators and con-
sistency in the asylum process.380 While these rules may not elimi-
nate all inconsistency in asylum claims based on intimate partner 
violence, they can resolve key issues in this type of case.
Scholars have also debated an amendment to the refugee defini-
tion under the INA, but concluded that, while an amendment may 
provide more certainty, new or amended regulations could be 
passed more quickly and easily than an amendment to the Act.381
Given the positions of the current administration, it is unlikely that 
new or amended regulations favorable to asylum claims from 
women fleeing intimate partner violence will be passed in the near 
378. Id. at 76,592.
379. Id. at 76,593.
380. Such regulations promulgated by DHS at 8 C.F.R. § 208 should also be duplicated 
and adopted by the DOJ at 8 C.F.R. § 1208. As a result, asylum officers within USCIS under 
DHS and immigration judges and the BIA under the DOJ would be bound by the regula-
tions. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2549–50; Robins, supra note 36, at 442–43.
381. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2539–44 (arguing there is precedent for legislative ac-
tion to amend the INA, but such action is unlikely and difficult, while regulatory reform 
would be easier and more effective in resolving the difficulties faced by asylum claims based 
on intimate partner violence); see also Natalie Rodriguez, Note, Give Us Your Weary but Not 
Your Battered: The Department of Homeland Security, Politics and Asylum for Victims of Domestic Vio-
lence, 18 SW. J. INT’L. L. 317, 334 (2011) (arguing that legislative action to amend the INA is 
the best solution to the issues presented in asylum claims based on intimate partner violence 
but, until an amendment can be achieved, regulations should be promulgated).
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future. An amendment to the refugee definition under the INA 
may be more probable, although still unlikely, and would provide 
the added benefit of certainty. Further, there is precedent for an 
amendment to the INA to provide protections to certain types of 
asylum claims. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act to provide protections for 
persons fleeing coercive family planning measures in China. This 
Act amended the definition of “refugee” in the INA to recognize 
that:
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a per-
son who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to under-
go involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for 
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other 
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall 
be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he 
or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or sub-
ject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance 
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution 
on account of political opinion.382
Similar to new regulations, amendments to the INA could also 
provide definitions and guidance particular to gender-based asy-
lum claims, including those involving intimate partner violence. 
These amendments may be related to the particular social group 
ground, the nexus between the persecution and the particular so-
cial group, persecution by non-state actors when the government is 
unable or unwilling to provide protection, and the proper analysis 
of the viability of relocation, as well as credibility determinations. 
As such, the following recommendations refer both to new legisla-
tion and regulations.
1. Incorporate Gender as a 
Particular Social Group into the Refugee Definition 
A new piece of legislation and/or updated regulations should 
define “particular social group” and specifically list gender as an 
identified “particular social group.” The definition of a particular 
382. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
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social group in the proposed regulations from 2000 is taken from 
Matter of Acosta.383 The proposed rules stated, 
“A particular social group is composed of members who 
share a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, 
color, kinship ties, or past experience, that a member ei-
ther cannot change or that is so fundamental to the identi-
ty or conscience of the member that he or she should not 
be required to change it.”384
Not only did these rules recognize sex as an immutable characteris-
tic, but they also acknowledged that circumstances may exist under 
which marital status or any intimate relationship could be consid-
ered an immutable trait when there is evidence that the victim 
could not reasonably be expected to leave the relationship.385
When the rules were proposed, the BIA had not yet fully articu-
lated its additional requirements of particularity and social distinc-
tion to demonstrate a particular social group. Since 2000, the BIA 
has solidified these two additional requirements in Matter of 
M-E-V-G-, Matter of W-G-R-, and subsequent cases, including Matter of 
A-B-.386 The requirements of particularity and social distinction are 
confusing, repetitive, and superfluous. When set forth as absolute 
requirements for demonstrating a particular social group, they 
have served and will continue to serve as an impediment to the 
recognition of gender-based asylum claims, in particular those in-
volving intimate partner violence. This is clearly demonstrated in 
the Attorney General’s flawed analysis in Matter of A-B-.387
New legislation and regulations should return to the Matter of 
Acosta definition of particular social group, as this definition closely 
follows that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) guidelines, which has rejected any additional re-
quirement of social distinction or perception to demonstrate a par-
ticular social group. Rather, similar to the UNHCR’s guidelines, 
the definition should include social perception as an alternative el-
ement in establishing the existence of a particular social group. 
383. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
387. See Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2016).
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The UNHCR’s Social Group Guidelines incorporate the two dom-
inant approaches to determining what constitutes a social group.388
The first approach, called the “protected characteristics” approach, 
as in Matter of Acosta, involves examining whether a group is com-
prised of persons sharing an immutable characteristic, or one that 
is so fundamental to individual identity a person “should not be 
compelled to forsake it.”389
The second approach, called the “social protection” approach, 
which has similarities to the BIA’s social distinction and particulari-
ty requirements, looks at “whether or not a group shares a com-
mon characteristic which makes them a cognizable group or sets 
them apart from society at large.”390 The UNHCR recognized that 
sometimes the application of these two approaches to a similar 
case may bring about different results, and the guidelines provided 
a definition that incorporates both approaches391:
A particular social group is a group of persons who share a 
common characteristic other than their risk of being perse-
cuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The 
characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchange-
able, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, con-
science or the exercise of one’s human rights.392
Accordingly, new proposed legislation and regulations could de-
fine a particular social group as:
composed of members who share a common, immutable 
characteristic, such as sex, gender, color, kinship ties, or 
past experience, or who are perceived as a group by society. 
The characteristic is one which the member either cannot 
change or that is so fundamental to the identity or con-
science of the member that he or she should not be re-
quired to change it. 
388. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ¶¶ 5–10, U.N. Doc. 
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Social Group Guidelines].
389. Id. ¶ 6.
390. Id. ¶ 7.
391. Id. ¶ 10.
392. See id. ¶¶ 9–10
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Similar to the UNHCR definition in its Social Group Guidelines, 
this definition includes both those “who share a common charac-
teristic” and those “who are perceived as a group by society,” but 
does not require both approaches to be met.393 Moreover, this def-
inition includes recognition of gender394 as an immutable trait. 
This will eliminate any further confusion for adjudicators about 
whether gender alone constitutes a particular social group.
The recognition of gender alone as a particular social group will 
remove the extensive and confusing analysis required in defining 
gender-based social groups as persons who are married or in do-
mestic relationships and are unable to leave the relationship.395 It 
will eliminate the need for an overly narrow identification of a 
gender-related particular social group, which limits a case’s ap-
plicability as a source of precedent in future cases.396 The immuta-
ble characteristic of the social group in an asylum claim based on 
intimate partner violence is gender. Whether or not an asylum 
seeker has the ability to leave the relationship is best examined in 
the context of whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of
persecution and in considerations of the viability of relocation, as 
discussed below.397
a. Other Strategies for the Incorporation of Gender into the 
Refugee Definition
The identification of gender as a particular social group through 
new legislation or regulations would be the most effective way to 
eliminate the inconsistencies and ambiguity in asylum claims based 
on intimate partner violence. However, adjudicators and scholars 
393. Id. ¶ 10.
394. Although distinctions have been made between the meanings of the words “sex”
and “gender,” that discussion is outside the scope of this Article. For instance, sex is a bio-
logical determination and “[g]ender refers to the relationship between women and men 
based on socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and responsi-
bilities that are assigned to one sex or another. . . .” UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 
10, ¶ 3. In recognition of this distinction and the potential confusion that could result, this 
Article recommends the inclusion of both “sex” and “gender” in the definition.
395. Other scholars support the recognition of sex or gender as a particular social 
group. See, e.g., Deborah E. Anker et al., Defining “Particular Social Group” in Terms of Gender: 
The Shah Decision and U.S. Law, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005, 1006 (1999); Corrales, supra
note 168, at 90; Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS.
Q. 213, 261–62 (1995); Marsden, supra note 3, at 2544; Reimann, supra note 69, at 1254–55; 
Sidun, supra note 178, at 141.
396. Bookey, supra note 167, at 13–15.
397. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996).
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have used or proposed a number of other approaches for analyz-
ing asylum claims based on intimate partner violence.
First, scholars have proposed that gender should be a sixth 
ground for asylum in addition to race, religion, nationality, politi-
cal opinion, and particular social group.398 As a separate ground, 
gender can be interpreted outside the construct of the particular 
social group category.399 Similar to identifying gender as a particu-
lar social group, gender as a sixth ground for asylum would elimi-
nate the need to narrow particular social groups of women identi-
fied in gender-related asylum cases.400 However, creating an
entirely new category such as gender will require developing a
whole new framework for interpretation and analysis. 
In contrast, the “particular social group” category has an existing 
history of interpretation and analysis that can be used.401 As pro-
posed above, new legislation and regulations may incorporate as-
pects of that history including Matter of Acosta’s common immuta-
ble characteristic requirement and a societal perception 
requirement that has a relationship to the BIA’s Matter of M-E-V-G-
social visibility and particularity tests. The societal perception re-
quirement could follow the UNHCR’s approach, rather than the 
BIA’s confusing social visibility and particularity tests, and could be 
used in the alternative to the common immutable characteristic 
requirement—not as an additional requirement.402 Moreover, the 
addition of gender as a sixth ground for asylum would set apart the 
refugee definition in U.S. asylum law from other countries in a very 
important way.403 Internationally, the push has been centered on 
398. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Hueben, Domestic Violence and Asylum Law: The United States 
Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution, 70 UMKC L. REV. 453, 466 
(2001) (arguing that by adding gender as a ground for asylum, women would only have to 
prove persecution on account of gender); Randall, supra note 40, at 566 (arguing that gen-
der must be “legally recognized as its own ground of persecution”); Mattie L. Ste-
vens, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category,
3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179 (1993) (arguing that only a sixth refugee category, gender, 
can ensure that the refugee definition will address the harms particular to women).
399. Barreno, supra note 47, at 254–55; Hueben, supra note 397.
400. See Hueben, supra note 397.
401. See Andrea Binder, Gender and the “Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 193 (2001) (asserting that while a 
“reformulation of the refugee definition would be desirable,” a focus on “improving the 
administrative and judicial practices with regard to the existing conventional and statutory 
framework” may be more promising).
402. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 261–62 (acknowledging that if the UNHCR definition 
is adopted in the U.S., adjudicators would have to choose whether to apply UNHCR’s social 
perception approach).
403. See Macklin, supra note 394, at 262.
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gender as a particular social group and guidelines have been de-
veloped around this strategy.404
Second, some scholars have advocated for consideration of asy-
lum claims based on intimate partner violence in the context of 
other grounds for asylum, such as political opinion.405 The belief 
that women are entitled to be treated as human beings is a political 
opinion,406 and leaving an intimate partner relationship where the 
woman is abused and the state sponsors or is complicit in the sub-
jugation of women is an expression of that political opinion.407
However, in the context of intimate partner violence, the victim is 
not being persecuted because of her “belief,” but because she is a 
woman and the abuser believes that she is subordinate.408
This approach could be an effective basis for an asylum claim 
when a woman resisted the abuse in some way prior to fleeing to 
the United States, such as leaving the relationship, and the state 
has supported or been complicit in the subjugation of women. Yet, 
when the applicant has not attempted to leave the relationship 
prior to fleeing to the United States, this strategy fails to establish 
that the abuser persecuted the victim on account of her belief that 
women are entitled to be treated as human beings and, therefore, 
to be free from abuse. Further, this approach would not help asy-
lum claims based on intimate partner violence move away from an 
overemphasis on the victim’s attempts to leave the relationship.
Third, some adjudicators who are reluctant to accept gender 
alone as forming the particular social group rely on the “gender 
plus” strategy, which creates particular social groups based on gen-
der plus other immutable characteristics. In Matter of A-B-, the At-
torney General focused on the proposed social groups defined by 
404. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; UNHCR Social Group Guidelines,
supra note 387.
405. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Batterers as Agents of the State: Challenging the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction in Intimate Partner Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
117, 156–59 (2012) (arguing that intimate partner violence may be inflicted on account of a 
woman’s political opinion); Alice Edwards, Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with In-
ternational Refugee Law and Policy 1950–2010, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 21, 28 (2010) (asserting 
that reliance only on the particular social group ground for women’s asylum claims ignores 
women’s role as political actors); see also Randall, supra note 50, at 298–99 (discussing the 
argument for consideration of gender persecution in the context of political opinion).
406. Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 155; see also Randall, supra note 50, at 298–99.
407. Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 158.
408. See Macklin, supra note 178, at 58–59 (“[D]omestic violence is not about what a 
woman believes, but about her gender identity—and the sexist beliefs of the man who abus-
es her.”); Sidun, supra note 178, at 138–39 (“The majority of women abroad are not raped 
or beaten because of a political opinion that they hold. Women are raped and beaten be-
cause they are women.”).
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the gender-plus approach and ignored the social group proposed 
by Matter of A-B-, which defined particular social group by gender 
alone. The gender-plus approach was also used frequently in cases 
prior to Matter of A-B- including in Matter of A-R-C-G-. Adjudicators’
analyses of social groups based on gender plus, as exhibited in Mat-
ter of A-B-, are often confusing and lead to piecemeal and incon-
sistent results in these cases. Even when such an asylum claim is 
approved, the determination based on a narrowly defined particu-
lar social group may have little precedential value.409 Undoubtedly, 
the failure to recognize that gender alone is the basis for the per-
secution and forms the particular social group deprives victims of 
intimate partner violence of protection.410
The idea that gender may form a particular social group is not a 
new concept. Adjudicators in the United States, the UNHCR, and 
other countries have acknowledged this.411 Nevertheless, many ad-
judicators continue to resist granting asylum based on gender 
alone for fear of opening the floodgates to women asylum seek-
ers.412
b. Opening the Floodgates
The primary argument against creating gender as a particular 
social group is that it would create a “flood” of women asylum 
seekers.413 Such arguments fail to recognize that race, religion, na-
tionality, and political opinion all have the potential to incorporate 
409. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 261–63; see also Bookey, supra note 167.
410. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 261–63.
411. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; UNHCR Social 
Group Guidelines, supra note 387; Reimann, supra note 69, at 1240 (noting that Canada, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and some other European nations have recognized 
gender as a particular social group); Rodriguez, supra note 380, at 340–43 (finding that 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have recognized gender-based
asylum and have not had a flood of such applications).
412. See Marsden, supra note 10, at 2526–27 (asserting that while U.S. courts have 
acknowledged in dicta that gender may be a basis for an asylum claim, “in practice, courts 
have been reluctant to grant asylum on the basis of a particular social group defined solely 
or primarily by gender”); Randall, supra note 40, at 563 (recognizing that some U.S. adjudi-
cators in asylum cases have expressed concern that “gender is an over-broad category on 
which to define a social group”).
413. UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 7 (“The size of the group has some-
times been used as a basis for refusing to recognize ‘women’ generally as a particular social 
group. This argument has no basis in fact or reason, as the other grounds are not bound by 
this question of size.”).
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large numbers of people.414 The refugee definition incorporates 
many other elements that must be met in order to qualify for asy-
lum in addition to demonstrating that an asylum seeker falls under 
one of the five grounds for asylum. These elements include a well-
founded fear of persecution and proof that the state is unable or 
unwilling to provide protection when a non-state actor inflicts per-
secution.415 For example, while intimate partner abuse happens 
throughout the world, many countries are able and willing to pro-
vide protection to victims.416 In such circumstances, an asylum 
claim based on intimate partner violence would fail to meet the 
refugee definition. The asylum process in the United States is 
complex and difficult to complete successfully without (and even 
with) representation, and many cases are withdrawn or abandoned 
in the process.417 The recognition of gender as a particular social 
group would not lead to the grant of asylum in every gender-based 
asylum claim.418
Further, countries that recognize gender as a basis for persecu-
tion have not experienced a flood of women asylum seekers.419 In 
fact, as reported by a number of scholars and acknowledged by the 
Department of Homeland Security, Canada recognizes that gender 
may form a particular social group in intimate partner violence-
based asylum cases, but has not experienced an increase in gender-
based claims.420 Many women who have an asylum claim based on 
intimate partner violence may not want to risk leaving their abusive 
relationship due to fear of the abuser or family or cultural imped-
iments.421 Not all of these women have the resources to flee to the 
United States and make an application for asylum.422
Moreover, the size of an applicant’s social group is not a valid 
basis for rejecting their asylum claim based on gender.423 The U.S. 
414. Id.; see also UNHCR Social Group Guidelines, supra note 387, at 5 (explaining that 
the size of a social group is not relevant to whether it can be recognized for asylum purpos-
es); Randall, supra note 50, at 299; Anker et al., supra note 394, at 1010.
415. Randall, supra note 40, at 564; Megan Galicia, Comment, Fits and Starts: Towards 
Recognizing Gender as a Basis for Asylum in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 85 UMKC L. REV.
1013, 1031 (2017).
416. See Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 160.
417. Corrales, supra note 168, at 88–89.
418. Galicia, supra note 414.
419. Rodriguez, supra note 380, at 340–42.
420. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 46, at 132; Corrales, supra note 168, at 88–89;
Barreno, supra note 47, at 263; DHS Supplemental L-R- Brief, supra note 62, at 13 n.10.
421. See Cianciarulo, supra note 404, at 160–61.
422. See id. at 161.
423. Anker et al., supra note 394, at 1010 (“Fear of opening the ‘floodgates,’ however, is 
not an appropriate or necessary reason for subverting this branch of asylum law.”); Randall, 
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asylum law’s reluctance to acknowledge gender as a particular so-
cial group has forced female asylum seekers to create particular so-
cial groups that incorporate gender plus other characteristics, in-
cluding marital status and inability to leave, among many others. 
These have become unnecessarily narrow and complicated. The 
true immutable characteristic is gender.424
supra note 50, at 299 (arguing that concern about “floodgates” ignores “the essential nature 
of the refugee remedy” as a “case-by-case individual one”). As explained in detail by the Sev-
enth Circuit in Cece v. Holder:
In any event, the breadth of category has never been a per se bar to protected sta-
tus. As was noted in Iao v. Gonzales,
The number of followers of Falun Gong in China is estimated to be in 
the tens of millions, all of them subject to persecution . . . . [Because] 
[a]nyone, we suppose, can get hold of a book of [Falun Gong] teach-
ings, start doing the exercises, and truthfully declare himself or herself a 
bona fide adherent to Falun Gong[,] [t]he implications for potential 
Chinese immigration to the United States may be significant . . . . But 
Congress has not authorized the immigration services to [control Chi-
nese immigration] by denying asylum applications in unreasoned deci-
sions.
Many of the groups recognized by the Board and courts are indeed quite broad. 
These include: women in tribes that practice female genital mutilation; persons 
who are opposed to involuntary sterilization; members of the Darood clan and 
Marehan subclan in Somalia (1% of the population of Somalia are members of 
the Marehan subclan); homosexuals in Cuba; Filipinos of Chinese ancestry living 
in the Philippines (approximately 1.5% of the Philippines population has an iden-
tifiable Chinese background). The ethnic Tutsis of Rawanda numbered close to
700,000 before the genocide of 1994, and yet a Tutsi singled out for murder who 
managed to escape to the United States could surely qualify for asylum in this 
country. And undoubtedly any of the six million Jews ultimately killed in concen-
tration camps in Nazi-controlled Europe could have made valid claims for asylum, 
if only they had had that opportunity. Many of our asylum laws originated out of a 
need to address just such refugees from World War II. It would be antithetical to 
asylum law to deny refuge to a group of persecuted individuals who have valid 
claims merely because too many have valid claims. For this reason, we also reject 
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that the group of young-looking, attractive Albanian 
women who are forced into prostitution is not a cognizable social group because it 
is too broad and sweeping of a classification.
The safeguard against potentially innumerable asylum claims is found in the 
stringent statutory requirements for all asylum seekers which require that the ap-
plicant prove (1) that she has suffered or has a well-founded fear of suffering 
harm that rises to the level of persecution, (2) on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and (3) is 
unable or unwilling to return to her country because of the persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution.
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
424. Robins, supra note 36, at 446–47.
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2. Persecution by Non-State Actor—
Unwilling or Unable to Protect
Non-state actors are the primary perpetrators of persecution in 
gender-based asylum claims, particularly those involving intimate 
partner violence.425 The historic cultural acceptance and legal 
treatment of intimate partner violence as a private family matter 
has continually been an impediment to the success of asylum cases 
based on intimate partner violence.426 This is no more evident than 
in the Attorney General’s determination in Matter of A-B-. While 
police reporting may be relevant and supportive of a state’s inabil-
ity or unwillingness to protect women from domestic abuse, this ev-
idence may be difficult to obtain. A failure to report the crime may 
be due to the victim’s fear of retaliation from the abuser, the vic-
tim’s shame, or the victim’s view that the state will not provide any 
protection and reporting abuse would be useless.427 These are con-
sequences of cultural and legal acceptance of intimate partner vio-
lence as a private matter. 
The proposed regulations from 2000 adopted a two-element ap-
proach to analyze whether a state is unwilling or unable to pro-
tect428: First, did the state take reasonable steps to control the inflic-
tion of harm or suffering?429 Second, did the victim have
reasonable access to state protection that exists?430 As argued by 
Elsa Bullard, this proposed rule fails to explain whether both ele-
ments or only one element must be met to establish a state’s un-
willingness or inability to protect the victim.431 Moreover, the first 
element should not be a determining factor in the analysis.432 A
state may have taken reasonable steps to control the infliction of 
harm, but that does not mean that the steps have been effective. 
Rather, as proposed by Ms. Bullard, the inquiry in new legislation 
425. Id.; Musalo supra note 44, at 49.
426. Id.; Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524–25; see also Markey, supra note 265, at 1322 (stat-
ing that in asylum law and international human rights law, “gender has been historically de-
politicized—cast as private, personal, and cultural”); Musalo, A Short History, supra note 44.
427. See Dutton, supra note 303, at 1232 (describing the factors that influence women’s 
responses to domestic violence); see also, e.g., In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 
2014) (describing Guatemalan police’s refusal to interfere in a marital relationship), over-
ruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); Kuennen, supra note 305, at 857, 878.
428. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Elsa M. Bullard, Note, Insufficient Government Protection: The Inescapable Element in 
Domestic Violence Asylum Cases, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1888 (2011).
432. Id. at 1892–93.
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and regulations should focus solely on the second element of 
whether the victim has reasonable access to state protection.433
The proposed regulations included a non-exhaustive list of fac-
tors that may be helpful in determining this issue. These included: 
government complicity, attempts by the applicant to obtain protec-
tion from the government and the government’s response, official 
action that is perfunctory, pattern of government unresponsive-
ness, general country conditions and denial of services, the nature 
of the government’s policies with respect to the harm, and steps 
taken by the government to prevent the harm.434 Likewise, the BIA 
in Matter of A-R-C-G- provided an instructive list of evidence perti-
nent to a state’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection, 
albeit confusingly addressed in regard to part of its “social distinc-
tion” requirement. The list of potential evidence included: country 
reports, law enforcement statistics, expert witnesses, an applicant’s
past experiences, and other credible sources of information.435
Even country reports and law enforcement statistics may not 
provide an accurate picture of the protection available for intimate 
partner violence victims in a country.436 This may be due to victims’
under-reporting or a failure to adequately track crimes affecting 
women.437 As such, expert reports addressing the treatment of 
women in the country and the protections afforded to women who 
suffer violence, if any exist, may present one of the most critical 
sources of evidence to document the inability or unwillingness of a 
state to protect victims of intimate partner violence. 
Similar to the list of factors in the proposed regulations from 
2000 and the BIA’s examples of evidence related to its “social dis-
tinction” requirement in Matter of A-R-C-G-, new legislation and 
regulations should include a similar non-exhaustive list of factors 
and evidence that could be used to establish that the state is unable 
or unwilling to protect domestic abuse victims. These factors could 
include whether there are criminal and civil laws designed to pro-
tect domestic abuse victims and, if so, whether those laws are en-
forced; cultural and societal perceptions on intimate partner vio-
433. Id.
434. Id.; Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (proposed 
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
435. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 395 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by In re A-B-, 27 I. & 
N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
436. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 69; Bullard, supra
note 431, at 1896.
437. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 69; Bullard, supra
note 431, at 1896.
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lence; other state actions or inaction on issues of intimate partner 
violence; country conditions; the relationship of the abuser to the 
state; and if the victim reported the abuse, any state responsiveness 
or lack of responsiveness. Further, credible sources of this infor-
mation may include, but are not limited to, an applicant’s past ex-
periences, expert witnesses, country reports, and law enforcement 
statistics. 
New legislation and regulations should explain that due to un-
derreporting of intimate partner violence occurrences or a focus 
on male-perpetuated crime, country reports and law enforcement 
statistics might not always provide an accurate depiction of a state’s
ability and willingness to protect victims of intimate partner vio-
lence. New law should further stress that a state’s “aspirations”
should not be considered dispositive of its actual ability or willing-
ness to protect. This is critical when using country reports as evi-
dence on this issue as country reports can sometimes focus on the 
state’s aspirations. However, this does not mean that the state actu-
ally provides meaningful protection or would even be able to pro-
vide meaningful protection in the future.
Finally, new legislation and regulations should state outright 
that an asylum seeker’s failure to report intimate partner violence 
is not “fatal” to her claim. As demonstrated in many federal circuit 
court cases, whether the asylum seekers reported the abuse to the 
police was essential to the courts’ determinations that the asylum 
seekers failed to demonstrate that the state was unable or unwilling 
to protect them. In complete disregard of the issues of retaliation, 
shame, cultural norms, and the futility of reporting intimate part-
ner violence to police in many of these circumstances, courts 
found that the asylum seekers did not give the state an “opportuni-
ty” to protect them. Any new law should explain that a failure to 
report abuse to the police is not a reason to deny an asylum claim. 
If there is evidence of police protection available to women and 
the asylum seeker did not seek such protection, the adjudicator 
may ask for reasons why she did not seek police protection, but the 
asylum seeker’s failure to report to police alone cannot be the basis 
for the denial.438
438. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 74 (citing a similar 
practice in Italy that is identified in this report as “good practice”).
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3. Nexus—The “On Account Of” Requirement
In Matter of A-B-, nexus once again emerged as a barrier to the 
approval of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence.439
Nexus will continue to be problematic in asylum claims involving 
intimate partner violence. This is because the private motivations 
of the abuser to harm the victim are difficult to demonstrate, in 
particular, when the abuser targets the victim based on gender and 
subordination, but does not seek to persecute other women.440 In 
order to resolve this issue, new legislation and regulations should 
adopt the bifurcated approach of UNHCR.441 The language pro-
vided in the UNHCR Gender Guidelines is a promising example of 
how the bifurcated approach could be added to legislation and 
regulations. The guidelines provide:
In cases where there is a risk of being persecuted at the 
hands of a non-State actor (e.g. husband, partner or other 
non-State actor) for reasons which are related to one of the 
Convention grounds, the causal link is established, whether 
or not the absence of State protection is Convention relat-
ed. Alternatively, where the risk of being persecuted at the 
hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a Convention 
ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to of-
fer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground, the 
causal link is also established.442
UNHCR’s approach forms the causal link between persecution and 
a Convention ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
and particular social group).443
This bifurcated approach in not new to U.S. asylum adjudica-
tions. In fact, the BIA used it in 1996 in Matter of Kasinga,444 but it 
has not been applied consistently, largely due to its narrow identi-
fication of the particular social group.445 In that case, the BIA ap-
proved a woman’s asylum application based on her well-founded 
439. See Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2016).
440. Marsden, supra note 3, at 2524 (“Women should not lose asylum’s protections 
merely because they are persecuted in isolation rather than in a group.”).
441. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 6.
442. Id.
443. Musalo, supra note 3, at 787–90 (analyzing the bifurcated approach).
444. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (B.I.A. 1996).
445. Musalo, A Short History, supra note 45, at 56; Shanyn Gillespie, Note, Terror in the 
Home: The Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Battered Women and a Proposal to Right the Wrong 
of In re R-A-, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 131, 139–147 (2003).
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fear of persecution on account of her membership in the particu-
lar social group comprised of “young women of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, 
and who oppose the practice.” The BIA’s decision recognized that 
the nexus between persecution and particular social group could 
be established in regard to non-state actors and the state or socie-
ty.446
Yet, the BIA’s conclusion just three years later, in Matter of R-A-,
appeared to eliminate the possibility that the “on account of” re-
quirement would be met when the persecutor did not harm other 
members of the particular social group.447 In direct response, the 
INS’s proposed regulations in 2000 specifically permitted the pos-
sibility that victims of domestic violence may fulfill the “on account 
of” requirement despite the fact that the persecutor had the op-
portunity and motivation to abuse “only one of the women who 
share this characteristic, because only one of these women [wa]s in 
a domestic relationship with the abuser.”448 However, the proposed 
regulations did not incorporate the bifurcated approach of Kasinga 
and, therefore, would not have resolved the recurring issue of the 
persecutor’s motivations. 
Since the problem for women who are persecuted is finding a 
nexus between the persecution and the particular social group 
ground, the bifurcated analysis has allowed the United Kingdom 
and other countries449 to give protection to women despite the 
nexus problem. The approach allows decision makers to consider
not only the motives of the persecutor, but also to take into ac-
count the State’s or society’s involvement in the persecution.450
This bifurcated analysis establishes the “causal connection” be-
tween the persecution and the particular social group based on the 
“non-State perpetrator or the State/society.”451
The bifurcated approach may be the least controversial solution 
to resolve the nexus issue in gender-based asylum claims as well as 
asylum claims based on other grounds, given that it has already 
been recognized in Kasinga and adopted by UNHCR guidelines 
446. Musalo, supra note 3, at 799.
447. Musalo, A Short History, supra note 45, at 56.
448. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
449. See Musalo, supra note 3, at 787–97 (discussing the bifurcated approach adopted in 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia).
450. Id. at 777–79.
451. Id. at 785–87.
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and other countries. However, this solution has limitations.452 For 
instance, adjudicators would still have significant discretion in de-
termining whether the persecution occurred on account of gender 
or if the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection based on 
gender. Adjudicators would still need to consider whether gender 
was one central reason for the persecution.
Further, the issue of whether the state is unable or unwilling to 
protect the asylum applicant could be addressed twice in intimate 
partner violence cases, both in the context of non-state actor per-
secution and then again in the context of nexus. In the nexus con-
text, if the applicant cannot establish intimate partner violence on 
account of her gender, not only would she need to demonstrate 
that the state is unable or unwilling to protect her, but also that the 
lack of protection occurs on account of gender. Simply demon-
strating that a state is unable or unwilling to provide protection 
alone can be difficult. This may open asylum claims based on inti-
mate partner violence to a whole new set of confusing and incon-
gruous determinations. 
Jessica Marsden suggests that the “historical and sociological ev-
idence tying domestic violence to gender warrants drawing the 
connection” between intimate partner violence and gender as a 
matter of law.453 In order to resolve the issue of nexus between in-
timate partner violence and gender, she strongly advocates for new 
regulations to specifically state, “where a woman has experienced 
intimate-partner violence that otherwise meets the standard for 
persecution, the victim’s gender shall be deemed to be one central 
reason for the persecution.”454 As Ms. Marsden explains, there is
precedent for acknowledging that certain elements of the refugee 
definition are met as a matter of law, particularly in regard to the 
one-child policy amendment to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1996.455 As a result of that legislative amendment, the defini-
tion of a refugee now recognizes that a person who has been per-
secuted or fears persecution related to a coercive population con-
trol program has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
political opinion.456
452. See Marsden, supra note 3, at 2541 (“Requiring adjudicators to assess the motives 
behind the government’s failure to act will not resolve the inconsistencies that we now see in 
the outcomes of domestic violence asylum claims, which stem from a more fundamental 
disbelief by some adjudicators that asylum covers domestic violence claims at all.”).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 2544.
455. See id. at 2542–43.
456. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
428 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
While Ms. Marsden’s intelligent and thoughtful proposal ad-
dresses the limitations of the nexus issue in intimate partner vio-
lence-based asylum claims by going beyond the bifurcated ap-
proach, it does not address many other types of gender-based 
persecution. The one child policy amendment was an optimistic 
sign in that it provided a clear path towards asylum for those indi-
viduals. However, the practice of piecemeal incorporation of very 
specific types of asylum claims to acknowledge that these claims 
meet certain elements of the refugee definition may not foster a 
positive, consistent progression in the interpretation of the refugee 
definition as it applies to gender-based claims. 
One solution may be for new legislation and regulations to pro-
vide a non-exhaustive list of the types of persecution that may be 
inflicted on account of a woman’s gender and from which a state 
may be unable or unwilling to provide protection on account of a 
woman’s gender. These illustrations could include: intimate part-
ner violence, sexual violence, family/domestic violence, coerced 
family planning, female genital mutilation, honor crimes, and vio-
lence or punishment for transgression of social mores, sexual ori-
entation, or gender identity.457 By providing such a non-exhaustive 
list in combination with recognizing gender as forming a particular 
social group, the nexus or causal link between the persecution or a 
state’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection and a wom-
an’s gender may be more comprehensively recognized in asylum
law.
4. Relocation
If an asylum seeker demonstrates past persecution, she is enti-
tled to the presumption that she also has a well-founded fear of 
persecution if returned to her country of nationality or habitual 
residence.458 The burden then shifts to DHS to overcome the pre-
sumption by proving either a “fundamental change of circum-
stances,” eliminating the asylum seeker’s well-founded fear, or that 
it is reasonable for the person to escape persecution by relocating 
in her country of nationality or habitual residence.459
457. See UNHCR Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 2 (“Gender-related claims have 
typically encompassed, although are by no means limited to, acts of sexual violence, family/
domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation, punishment for 
transgression of social mores, and discrimination against homosexuals.”).
458. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1) (2018).
459. Id. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 1208.13(b)(1).
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Matter of A-B- provided further confusion about what is required 
to determine whether asylum seekers can relocate within their 
country.460 Attorney General Sessions failed to allow for any sub-
stantive evaluation of the safety and reasonableness of relocation 
considering the individual’s family situation, social vulnerabilities, 
education or work background and opportunities, or the psycho-
logical effects of past persecution. New legislation and regulations 
should require that, in order for the presumption to be overcome, 
DHS must demonstrate no risk of persecution or harm in the area 
of relocation, the availability of state protection, the existence of 
family relationships in that area, the availability of basic subsistence 
and accommodation, and that health, social, religious, and cultural 
circumstances would not impede the viability of relocation.461
5. Credibility and Corroboration
As Matter of A-B- demonstrates, credibility determinations and 
the requirement of corroboration in asylum cases based on inti-
mate partner violence cases continue to be problematic.462 The 
REAL ID Act passed by Congress in 2005463 provides that an asylum 
seeker’s testimony, which is credible, may be sufficient to establish 
the asylum seeker’s burden without corroborating evidence.464 In 
order to rely on the applicant’s testimony alone, the testimony 
must be credible and persuasive, and refer to specific facts “suffi-
cient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”465 While the 
REAL ID Act on its face may appear to be liberal, in practice it is 
460. See, e.g., Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that
Ms. Fuentes-Erazo could safely relocate within Honduras because she had successfully avoid-
ed her abuser for five years and he had no interest in locating her, disregarding her testi-
mony regarding financial hardship); Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 290–91 (6th Cir. 2016)
(finding that Ms. Marikasi failed to “substantiate any religious, cultural, or legal constraints 
that prevented her from” leaving the relationship or relocating to another part of Zimba-
bwe); Jeronimo v. Att’y Gen., 678 F. App’x at 800 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that Ms. Jeroni-
mo failed to show she could not relocate to another area of Guatemala).
461. See Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 73; Lauren N. 
Kostes, Domestic Violence and American Asylum Law: The Complicated and Convoluted Road Post 
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 211, 236–37 (2015) (explaining the current stand-
ard).
462. See, e.g., Marikasi, 840 F.3d at 286 (upholding the immigration judge’s adverse cred-
ibility determination, finding that Ms. Marikasi’s inconsistent statements provided substan-
tial evidence that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as incon-
sistent”).
463. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2018).
464. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–61.
465. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018).
430 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
burdensome to some women asylum seekers because it places too 
much focus on the asylum seeker’s ability to articulate her ac-
counts of abuse with consistency in order to establish credibility.466
Trauma can have a dramatic impact on an asylum seeker’s abil-
ity to provide consistency in her statements.467 Asylum seekers who 
have suffered intimate partner violence may also have difficulty 
disclosing all information surrounding the persecution due to em-
barrassment, culture, language barriers, fear of retribution, or
simply a lack of understanding as to what is important to their 
case.468 Under the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations must 
consider the “totality of the circumstances.”469 Adjudicators may 
base a credibility determination on assessments of the asylum seek-
er’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” “the inherent plausi-
bility of the account,” and the consistency of the applicant’s state-
ments.470 In regard to the consistency of statements, the 
adjudicator assess consistency between written and oral statements,
internal consistency of statements, and the consistency of state-
ments with other evidence in the record, and any inaccuracies or 
falsehoods in these statements.471 The REAL ID Act fails to consider 
how trauma stemming from abuse, or any other factors, such as 
embarrassment, culture, language, fear of retribution, or lack of 
understanding, may impact demeanor or consistency.472
Inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements may increase the 
burden on the applicant to produce corroborating evidence.473
Further, even if the adjudicator finds her to be credible, she may 
require further corroboration from the applicant unless the appli-
cant can demonstrate that she “does not have the evidence and 
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”474 Yet, the fact that a non-
state actor inflicts the persecution in intimate partner violence-
based asylum cases makes them more difficult to corroborate than 
asylum claims involving a state actor.475
466. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–61.
467. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 67; Doedens, supra
note 68, at 121–22.
468. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–62.
469. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2018).
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Robins, supra note 36, at 460–62.
473. Id.
474. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2018).
475. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 43–45.
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Evidence of intimate partner violence-related persecution is dif-
ficult to gather and present given the private nature of the harm.476
As discussed previously, the applicant must demonstrate that the 
government is unwilling or unable to control the non-state actor. 
In assessing whether this has been demonstrated, adjudicators 
place significant emphasis on whether the applicant reported the 
abuse to police. An applicant may provide evidence to support the 
futility of reporting the abuse to the police, but such evidence is 
difficult to obtain.477 Intimate partner violence-related persecution 
may be hidden and significantly underreported in a country.478 As 
such, country conditions reports may not be able to accurately de-
tail the prevalence of intimate partner violence in a country and 
the extent to which the state enforces any protections for victims of 
intimate partner violence.479
Second, the asylum seeker must present information about the 
intimate partner violence-related persecution. There may not be 
any documentation demonstrating the abuse because the asylum 
seeker could not seek the help of family members or the commu-
nity or seek treatment from a hospital either due to cultural rea-
sons or fear of retribution. She may have even been prevented 
from seeking help by others.480 Even assuming there are medical 
records corroborating any abuse, she may not have anyone in her 
country who can obtain them for her.481 Further, family members 
or the community in the applicant’s country may not know of the 
abuse or may fear retribution from the abuser, as well, thereby pre-
venting them from providing affidavits supporting the applicant’s
testimony.482
New legislation and regulations should provide that only materi-
al inconsistencies may support an adverse credibility determina-
tion; identify the types of inconsistencies that may be material to 
an asylum case; incorporate the requirement of assessing how 
trauma and other personal and cultural factors may impact an asy-
lum seeker’s demeanor and her the ability to recall events and 
476. Robins, supra note 36, at 462.
477. Id. at 462–63.
478. Id. at 457.
479. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 69; Bullard, supra
note 431, at 1887–88, 1896.
480. Robins, supra note 36, at 457, 462.
481. Id.
482. Id.
432 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:2
provide consistency in testimony and statements.483 The asylum 
seeker should be given the opportunity to explain any material in-
consistencies and present expert analysis or other evidence in sup-
port of her explanation. Inconsistencies that are not material 
should not be considered in an assessment of credibility.484
B. Training and Mechanisms for Tracking and Review of 
Gender-Related Asylum Claims
New legislation and regulations addressing gender-related asy-
lum cases alone, particularly in the context of persecution in the 
form of intimate partner violence, will not provide the changes 
needed to foster fair, consistent, and predictable determinations in 
these cases.485 Education and training for adjudicators are essen-
tial.486 In fact, judicial education and training on has been a critical 
part of the improvements made in federal and state systems in the 
treatment of intimate partner violence claims.487
While training on gender issues has been, at times, compulsory 
for asylum officers,488 training on gender issues—in particular in-
timate partner violence-based asylum claims—should be compul-
sory for all adjudicators of asylum claims, including immigration 
judges, the BIA, and circuit court judges.489 This training should 
include discussion of the gender perspective in asylum claims, the 
fact that gender alone may form a particular social group, and the 
types of persecution, such as intimate partner violence, that occur 
on account of gender.490 Additionally, the training should address 
483. Doedens, supra note 68, at 121–22 (stating that asylum law should “place the 
memory loss in the context of the trauma suffered”).
484. While “material” is a subjective characterization and therefore, not ideal in a legal 
landscape in which adjudicators already have too much discretion, the term is one used 
throughout U.S. criminal, civil, and procedural law and, albeit imperfect, would be a signifi-
cant step in the right direction.
485. See Barreno, supra note 47, at 266–68.
486. Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14, at 372–73 (asserting that new regulations can-
not aid in the assessment of asylum claims made by victims of domestic violence if adjudica-
tors do not understand the dynamics and psychology of abusive relationships).
487. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 343; Lippman, supra note 343.
488. In 1995, the Immigration and Nationality Service adopted guidelines for asylum 
officers on asylum claims involving gender-related persecution. See Coven Memorandum,
supra note 69, at 17; see also USCIS Asylum Division Training Programs, USCIS,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-
programs (last updated Dec. 19, 2016).
489. Barreno, supra note 47, at 265.
490. Adjudicators in asylum cases often misunderstand the reasons for intimate partner 
violence. As explained by Professor Anjum Gupta,
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how gender-related persecution may support grounds for asylum 
other than the particular social group category.491
Training should also include sessions on the impact of culture, 
society, economics, individual trauma, and patterns and psychology 
of abusive relationships on asylum applicants.492 Understanding 
these factors could affect adjudicators’ approach to credibility de-
terminations in gender-based asylum claims.493 Adjudicators should 
further understand the common reasons behind a woman’s deci-
sion not to report abuse to the police, which may be based on 
these factors along with the futility of reporting gender-based 
claims in many countries, fear of retribution, and the position of 
women before the law.494
Further, the DOJ should develop a mechanism for tracking and 
compiling data on the outcome of gender-related asylum claims, 
including the gender-related claims that involve intimate partner 
violence, in order to combat the impact of judicial bias and heavy 
caseloads on gender-related claims.495 At this time, only a very small 
percentage of BIA decisions are precedent, and only decisions des-
ignated as precedent are published.496 This transparency issue 
could be combatted by creating a process for developing gender-
In asylum cases based on fear of domestic violence, immigration judges have rou-
tinely refused to find nexus to a protected ground, finding instead that the abuse 
occurred because the abuser was a “despicable person,” because of his “inherent 
meanness,” because of his alcohol abuse, because of his jealousy, or because of 
other “personal” or “criminal” reasons. This is the case despite the fact that, in 
many countries, it is clear that the vast majority of victims of domestic violence are 
women.
Anjum Gupta, Dead Silent: Heuristics, Silent Motives, and Asylum, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
1, 3 (2016); see also Barreno, supra note 47, at 266 (asserting that the DHS and DOJ should 
provide training to adjudicators on the nature of intimate partner violence and the claims 
that arise out of this violence in order to promote consistency).
491. See Alice Edwards, Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law, in REFUGEE 
PROTECTION INT’L L. 46, 67–71 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
492. See, e.g., Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 67 (rec-
ommending that decision makers are informed of the consequences of gender-related vio-
lence, including trauma, and trained on how these consequences of violence affect an asy-
lum seeker’s ability to give a consistent account of events); Cianciarulo & David, supra note 
14, at 372–73.
493. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 60, 67.
494. Cianciarulo & David, supra note 14, at 372–73.
495. Barreno, supra note 47, at 268.
496. Ange-Marie Hancock, When is Fear for One’s Life Race-Gendered? An Intersectional Anal-
ysis of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals’s In re A-R-C-G- Decision, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977,
2998 (2015); see also Bookey, supra note 142, at 109–10 (noting the lack of transparency re-
sulting from the fact that many BIA decisions are not published or available on a searchable 
database).
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disaggregated statistics on asylum applications and outcomes.497
Countries such as the United Kingdom and Sweden already em-
ploy this mechanism.498
The data compiled could be separated into specific types of 
gender-related asylum claims, including intimate partner violence. 
This will allow immigration judges, the BIA, federal circuit court 
judges, asylum officers, and governmental and non-governmental 
organizations to assess how gender-related claims involving inti-
mate partner violence and other forms of persecution are adjudi-
cated. In the absence of a tracking mechanism, there is no method 
for accurately assessing the impact of new legislation, regulations, 
and adjudicator training on asylum claims based on gender, par-
ticularly, those involving intimate partner violence.
CONCLUSION
Matter of A-B- demonstrates that the flawed analysis, confusion, 
and inconsistencies in the adjudications of asylum claims based on 
intimate partner violence persist. New legislation and regulations,
combined with judicial training and a process for tracking and 
compiling data on gender-based asylum claims, will provide neces-
sary guidance to asylum adjudicators to more consistently evaluate
claims based on gender and gender-based violence. 
However, the recommendations made in this Article cannot re-
solve all issues with the interpretation and application of the refu-
gee definition to asylum claims involving intimate partner violence. 
Even with new legislation and regulations providing direction in 
asylum claims involving intimate partner violence, adjudicators 
would still have some discretion in these cases. For instance, these 
proposed changes would not include a finding of nexus between 
the persecution and the victim’s gender as a matter of law in all 
asylum claims involving intimate partner violence persecution. Nor 
do these proposed changes specifically address intimate partner 
violence against men or same sex partners.
Nevertheless, no progress can be made in intimate partner vio-
lence-based asylum claims without new legislation or regulations 
497. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 21 (stating that all 
member states should be required to provide gender-disaggregated statistical information 
on asylum cases); Hancock, supra note 496, at 2998 (advocating for tracking of asylum 
claims to include information on gender-based claims and other immutable and fundamen-
tal characteristics).
498. Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe, supra note 336, at 22.
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that recognizes that gender may form a particular social group and 
provides guidance for adjudicating intimate partner violence-based 
asylum claims. If adjudicators continue to consider intimate part-
ner violence-based asylum claims without new legislation and regu-
lations, future determinations in these cases will continue to lack 
fairness, consistency, and predictability. Congress has the power 
and the responsibility to provide the reforms critical for these 
claims. Congress, through legislation, is able to provide the strong-
est and most consistent guidance in the adjudication of these 
claims. Alternatively, the present administration or a new admin-
istration must provide this guidance through regulation. 
Further, even with new legislation and regulations, as long as the 
United States continues to adjudicate asylum cases from the per-
spective that intimate partner violence is a personal matter unre-
lated to gender, there will be little progress in protecting women 
asylum seekers.499 These perceptions can only be eradicated 
through training and identifying ongoing issues in these cases,
through tracking and data compilation, so that they can be ad-
dressed. In order to demonstrate the United States’ commitment 
to gender equality, our legal system must remove the impediments 
to recognition of women’s asylum claims involving intimate part-
ner violence.
499. Gillespie, supra note 445, at 131–135.

